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Executive Summary
This study looks at the potential economic impact of a new WTO trade round. It starts
by noting that the essential motivation for launching multilateral negotiations to
liberalize trade is economic – there are substantial economic benefits which can be
realized from lowering barriers to international flows of goods and services. There are
a number of reasons why the expansion of world trade can have a favourable impact
on economic growth. In line with the principle of comparative advantage, trade leads
to a more efficient allocation of resources. It also facilitates the exploitation of
economies of scale, stimulates competition, and can lead to the transmission of
technology and knowledge
Countries usually approach trade negotiations with the objective of securing
reductions in their trading partners' trade barriers. The economic case for trade
liberalization, on the other hand, stresses the fact that the largest part of the gains
from multilateral liberalization usually come about as a result of countries' efforts to
reduce their own trade barriers. Trade protection shifts the economy to a less efficient
mix of production, consumption and investment, and can also create an anti-export
bias by encouraging resources which were previously allocated to exporting activities
to move into sectors which produce for the protected domestic market. In other words,
trade protection slows down growth and reduces economic welfare.
The study looks at the phenomenon of globalization – the process by which markets
and production in different countries are becoming increasingly interdependent due to
the dynamics of trade in goods and services and flows of capital and technology. By
comparing the growth of trade with the growth of output, it would seem that
globalization has accelerated over the course of the 1990s. This is also evident from
the increasing internationalization of the production process, the expansion in the
tradability of services, the emergence of developing countries as producers and
exporters of manufactures and the explosive growth of international capital flows.
Globalization has brought enormous benefits to both industrialized and developing
countries. However, governments need to develop coherent policies to ensure a more
equitable distribution of these benefits and to deal with some of the challenges which
globalization can bring. The increasing importance of the global economy explains
why there have been calls to expand the agenda of the next WTO round beyond
traditional market access concerns to also include subjects such as competition and
investment.
The study argues that developing countries could emerge as major beneficiaries of a
new multilateral trade round. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, their exports tend
to face higher trade barriers than the exports of the industrialized countries. They
therefore have a greater potential to gain from improved access to foreign markets for
their exports. Secondly, they also tend to have much higher levels of import protection
than the industrialized countries. Lowering these levels of protection would help to
improve the efficiency of resource allocation and would help to correct the significant
anti-export bias in many developing countries. However, a central problem for many
developing countries, including, in particular, the least-developed countries, is that
they suffer from inadequate domestic policy environments. Domestic policy reform is
essential in many developing countries if they are to participate more fully in the global
economy. In addition, complementary policies are needed to ensure that a larger
share of the welfare gains which developing countries can expect from trade
liberalization are allocated to tackling poverty.4
The standard tool which economists now use to quantify the impact of multilateral
trade liberalization is a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. A CGE model is
a computer representation of the economy which can explicitly take into account inter-
linkages between different sectors. CGE models can therefore be used to study the
economy-wide implications of major policy changes. The study used results generated
by the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) CGE model. This is one of the most well
known CGE models and is the model which is most widely used to study the impact of
changes in trade policy. The version of the GTAP model used by in this paper has
nine world regions, each of which are divided into nineteen sectors covering all
agricultural, industrial and services production. The sectors allow for a mixture of
perfectly-competitive and imperfectly-competitive industries. The simulations were run
by an independent expert, Professor Joseph Francois of Erasmus University,
Rotterdam, who was responsible for constructing the version of the GTAP model used
here.
The results indicate that the global welfare gains from a comprehensive multilateral
trade round could be substantial. In the first instance, the study looked at across-the-
board cuts in trade protection across all agricultural, industrial and services sectors by
all countries. Two scenarios were considered – a 20 per cent and a 50 per cent global
cut in protection. Each of these scenarios was combined with a WTO agreement on
trade facilitation, which it is assumed leads to a modest reduction (conservatively
estimated at 1 per cent) in the transactions costs associated with international trade.
The results from the GTAP model indicate that the annual welfare gain for the world
as a whole from such a market access plus trade facilitation package could range
from $220 billion in the case of the 20 per cent scenario to nearly $400 billion in the
case of the 50 per cent scenario. This represents an annual increase in global welfare
of between 0.8 and 1.4 per cent, which is roughly equivalent to adding an economy
the size of Korea or the Netherlands to the world each year. The figures for the 50 per
cent scenario are similar to those produced by a recent study by the Australian
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, although the latter does not look at trade
facilitation. They are also roughly twice as much as the OECD's estimates of the
welfare gains which can be expected from full implementation of the Uruguay Round.
All regions gain from multilateral trade liberalization, although the distribution of the
gains is somewhat uneven because of differences in existing levels of protection. The
annual welfare gain for the EU is estimated at roughly $50 billion in the case of the 20
per cent scenario and nearly $100 billion in the case of the 50 per cent scenario. The
greater part of the welfare gains accrue outside the major industrialized nations, with
the developing countries emerging as major beneficiaries. However, if the developing
countries implement less extensive liberalization than envisaged here (e.g. by cutting
bound tariffs whilst leaving applied rates broadly unchanged), their expected gains will
be substantially reduced.
The study then looked at the possible impact of a WTO agreement on trade and
competition. The GTAP model was adapted to allow for oligopolistic markets in which
firms can collude between each other. Even if a WTO agreement were to lead to only
a modest reduction (of 10 per cent) in the degree of collusion, the model indicates that
this would produce a global welfare gain of around $85 billion on an annual basis.
Again, all regions gain from the agreement but the distribution is uneven. Developing
countries, the majority of whom do not currently have proper competition regulations,
are the major beneficiaries. It was not possible to adapt the GTAP model to consider
the impact of a WTO agreement on investment. However, independent calculations
suggest that even if such an agreement were to lead to only a modest improvement in
resource allocation, this could result in an annual increase in global welfare of around
$75 billion. The welfare gains should be highest in those countries where the current5
investment regime is most in need of improvement. In other words, many developing
countries could again be significant beneficiaries.
The figures reported in this paper are intended to illustrate the more fundamental
proposition that there are mutual gains from multilateral trade liberalization. It should
be remembered that any modelling exercise necessarily rests on assumptions. The
assumptions underlying the model have to be taken into account when interpreting the
figures. Furthermore, because the model has been used to make predictions, it is
subject to the limitations which are common to all forecasting exercises.
In parallel to this paper, a separate study of the potential implications of a new WTO
round on sustainable development is being conducted for the Commission by
independent consultants. Its focus is on the possible environmental and social impact
of the new round.6
1. Introduction
1.1. Multilateral trade liberalization: unfinished business
1.1.1. This paper provides an initial appraisal of the potential economic impact of
further multilateral trade liberalization which may follow from a new WTO round. The
Third Ministerial Conference of the WTO, which is scheduled to take place in Seattle
from 30 November to 3 December 1999, is expected to launch new negotiations to
extend liberalization and to strengthen and expand further the rules governing
international trade. This paper argues that if these negotiations lead to significant and
wide-ranging liberalization, the benefits for the world economy could be substantial,
with all countries emerging as potential beneficiaries.
1.1.2. It should be pointed out that the motivation for launching negotiations to
liberalize trade is ultimately an economic one – there are substantial economic
benefits which can be realized from lowering barriers to international flows of goods
and services. Economists recognize several channels through which trade
liberalization can have a favourable impact on economic growth. In line with the
principle of comparative advantage, trade liberalization leads to a more efficient
allocation of resources. Trade liberalization can also stimulate growth by facilitating
the exploitation of economies of scale, promoting competition, and encouraging the
transmission of technology and knowledge.
1.1.3. Throughout the post-war period, the expansion of international trade has
served as one of the engines of the global economy. This expansion has been greatly
facilitated by the reductions in trade barriers undertaken by both industrialized and
developing countries. The eight previous rounds of multilateral negotiations conducted
under the auspices of the GATT/WTO have seen industrialized countries' average
tariffs come down from over 40 per cent in 1940 to less than 4 per cent today. In
recent years, extensive trade liberalization programmes have also been undertaken in
a growing number of developing countries, an increasing number of whom are now
export-oriented economies. However, whilst considerable progress has been made by
both industrialized and developing countries in reducing trade barriers, numerous
quantitative studies show that the benefits of further reducing trade protection could
be very high. In other words, both industrialized and developing countries are still
paying a very high cost for their current levels of trade protection. This cost is usually
far higher for the country imposing trade barriers than for its trading partners. This is
because trade barriers reduce the efficiency of resource allocation by distorting
production, consumption and investment decisions. One important consequence of
the distortionary nature of trade protection is that a tax on imports is also, in effect, a
tax on exports. High levels of import protection can result in an anti-export bias by
creating an incentive for resources devoted to exporting activities to move into sectors
which produce for the protected domestic market. This anti-export bias is highest in
developing countries who, despite their recent efforts to open up their economies, are
still suffering from the legacies of previous import-substitution policies. By encouraging
developing countries to continue with trade liberalization, a new WTO round could
make a significant contribution to raising their growth prospects.
Agriculture and services: the “built-in agenda”
1.1.4. The precise agenda for the new negotiations to be launched at Seattle has yet
to be agreed by the membership of the WTO. Only two areas will definitely be subject
to negotiations. These are agriculture and services. Resumption of negotiations in
these two areas was agreed to as part of the final package of the previous round, the
Uruguay Round.7
1.1.5. The rules governing agricultural trade were properly discussed for the first
time during the Uruguay Round negotiations which were completed in 1994. Despite
the achievements of the Uruguay Round in extending multilateral discipline to this
sector, world trade in agricultural products remains significantly distorted.
1 Distortions
exist in the three key areas of market access, export subsidies and domestic producer
subsidies, and are generally higher in the industrialized countries than in the
developing countries. A recent study argues that fully one-third of the global welfare
gain from eliminating industrialized countries' distortions across all goods sectors
could come from liberalization in agriculture.
2 Industrialized countries are likely to gain
from a liberalization of world agricultural trade through an enhanced efficiency of
resource allocation, reduced budgetary costs and improved consumer welfare. Many
developing countries have a comparative advantage in agriculture, and will therefore
have a significant interest in reducing distortions in this sector. The impact of
liberalization on some least-developed countries who are net food-importers is,
however, less clear-cut. Reductions in industrialized countries' agricultural export
subsidies will have a negative impact on their terms-of-trade, but this may be
compensated by other, positive effects.
3 As a result of the "built-in agenda"
established by the Uruguay Round, WTO members have committed themselves to
resume agricultural negotiations by 31 December 1999.
1.1.6. The other subject which is included in the so-called built-in agenda is services
trade. Services are increasingly at the heart of the global economy, and already
account for about 60 per cent of world output. In recent years, trade in services has
been growing faster than trade in merchandise goods. Technological advances have
made many services increasingly tradable. Other services remain difficult to trade,
however, and producers must supply foreign markets through commercial presence,
which explains why the internationalization of services is closely linked to the growth
of foreign direct investment (FDI). Until recently, trade in services has not been
subject to the same type of multilateral discipline as that applying to trade in goods.
With the adoption of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) as a result
of the Uruguay Round, this is now changing. The GATS establishes a basic
framework of rules for liberalizing trade in services and contains national commitments
on market access for services provided by foreign firms. Since the Uruguay Round,
negotiations have been concluded on basic telecommunications and financial
services. Extending liberalization across all services sectors is expected to lead to
further welfare gains for both industrialized and developing countries. The gains for
the industrialized countries are perhaps obvious, in that they are major suppliers of a
wide range of services. However, it is worth emphasizing the gains to developing
countries from further services liberalization. Services are becoming increasingly
important in the economies of the developing countries. In particular, they are
assuming a larger role as inputs to industrial production. By liberalizing their own
services sectors, developing countries can therefore improve the competitiveness of
their industrial sectors. The scope for developing countries to benefit from further
liberalization in services is illustrated by the fact that they made far fewer market
access commitments than did the industrialized countries in the Uruguay Round.
Under the built-in agenda, WTO members have committed themselves to re-open
services negotiations by 1 January 2000.
1 The degree of agricultural liberalization achieved by the Uruguay Round is explored in Merlinda D. Ingco,
"Agricultural Trade Liberalization in the Uruguay Round: One Step Forward, One Step Back?", Policy Research
Working Paper No. 1500, World Bank, 1995.
2 See Kym Anderson, Bernard Hoekman and Anna Strutt, "Agriculture and the WTO: Next Steps", paper presented at
a Centre for Economic Policy Research Workshop on New Issues in the World Trading System, London, 19-20
February, 1999.
3 T h i si s s u ei se x p l o r e di ns e c t i o n4 .8
Beyond the built-in agenda
1.1.7. In addition to agriculture and services, many WTO members have proposed
including other subjects in the agenda for the new round. According to the WTO
Secretariat, more than 150 proposals had been tabled by mid-September 1999. The
list of additional subjects which have been proposed by WTO members includes
industrial tariffs, anti-dumping, subsidies, safeguards, trade and investment, trade
facilitation, electronic commerce, trade and competition, trade and environment,
government procurement, technical assistance, capacity-building and other
development issues.
1.1.8. The analysis in this paper focuses on the several of the areas highlighted here.
In other words, it is assumed that the Seattle Ministerial Conference will launch a
comprehensive trade round which will extend beyond market access negotiations in
agriculture and services. Industrial tariffs have been included in each of the
previous multilateral trade rounds, resulting in a great deal of liberalization by both
industrialized and developing countries. Despite this, the indications are that
significant welfare gains could be achieved from further tariff liberalization. Developing
countries, in particular, have much to gain from reducing their own trade barriers on
industrial products, as well as from securing improved access to industrialized
countries' markets for their exports. This is particularly true in relation to manufactured
products. The 1990s have witnessed the emergence of developing countries as major
producers and exporters of manufactures, and this helps to explain why developing
countries are expected to reap significant gains from further liberalization of trade in
manufactures.
4 It is also worth emphasizing that most countries' tariff structures are
far from uniform. Both industrialized and developing countries can therefore benefit
from adopting simpler and more uniform tariff structures, lowering peak tariffs and
reducing tariff escalation.
1.1.9. Another subject which may feature in the negotiations to be launched at
Seattle is trade facilitation. There is widespread agreement that inefficient and
unnecessary import, export and customs procedures have impeded trade flows and
prevented countries from maximizing the benefits which should follow from
liberalization of formal trade barriers. The simplification and harmonization of these
procedures through a WTO-based agreement could therefore yield significant
benefits. These benefits are likely to be greatest for small and medium-sized
enterprises, for whom the costs associated with complicated and cumbersome trade
procedures are likely to be disproportionately large. The gains are also likely to be
largest for developing countries. The introduction of modern customs techniques in
developing countries should contribute to improving the efficiency of revenue
collection by customs authorities and should also help to lower the costs faced by
importers and exporters. Trade facilitation may therefore be an important
complementary policy to the liberalization of tariffs and other trade barriers intended to
expand the export potential of the developing countries.
1.1.10. The potentially complementary nature of trade and competition policy has
been appreciated by economists for some time. Despite this, the majority of the
WTO's members do not currently have effective competition regulations. Furthermore,
there is, at present, no multilateral framework regulating the application of competition
law to anti-competitive practices by firms. Many WTO Members have therefore argued
that the lack of such a framework means that anti-competitive practices, such as
4 One study suggests that developing countries may capture up to 95 per cent of the global gains from manufacturing
trade liberalization. See Thomas Hertel and Will Martin, "Developing Country Interests in Liberalizing Manufactures
Trade", paper presented at a Centre for Economic Policy Research Workshop on New Issues in the World Trading
System, London, 19-20 February, 1999.9
price-fixing and market-sharing arrangements between firms, may seriously impair the
ability of countries to benefit from increased trade and investment flows. They believe
that the need for a multilateral framework on competition is also reinforced by the
increasing globalization of business activities. Multinational firms are increasingly able
to exercise market power on a global basis. Furthermore, a growing number of
competition cases now have an international dimension. The basic architecture of an
international competition framework could include core principles and common rules
relating to the adoption and enforcement of competition law, common approaches on
anti-competitive practices with a significant impact on international trade and
investment, and international co-operation on competition policy. The adoption of such
a framework could add significantly to the overall benefits which countries can expect
from further multilateral trade liberalization. This is particularly true for the developing
countries, since they currently do not have adequate competition policy regulations.
1.1.11. Just as international trade has benefited from the security and transparency
provided by the rules-based multilateral system, the argument has been made that
similar benefits could be expected from a WTO-based agreement on investment.T h e
rapid growth of foreign direct investment (FDI) flows in recent years, particularly to
developing countries, suggests the need for more comprehensive rules in this domain.
The desire of developing countries to attract increased FDI inflows reflects the view
that such inflows may promote economic development by stimulating productivity
growth and boosting exports.
5 The growth of FDI flows has been facilitated by the
adoption of bilateral investment treaties (BITs). However, the proliferation of BITs in
recent years does not guarantee the objective of a stable and predictable climate for
investment on a world-wide basis. Many WTO members have therefore argued that a
multilateral agreement that grants foreign firms access to such protected markets
could be beneficial to both host and source countries. A binding multilateral framework
would also enhance the credibility of countries' policy regimes. If potential investors
are risk averse, the adoption of more investment-friendly policies may be insufficient
by themselves to enable countries to benefit from increased inward flows of FDI. This
is especially so in countries with a history of policy reversals. By committing
themselves to accept international rules, on the other hand, countries can make
credible guarantees against further policy reversals, thus anchoring the expectations
of investors.
1.2. The economic analysis of multilateral trade liberalization
1.2.1. The conduct of multilateral trade negotiations tends to be somewhat
mercantilistic. Countries regard liberalization of their own trade as a concession which
should only be "given up" in exchange for similar concessions from other countries.
The mercantilist approach therefore emphasizes the benefits to be achieved from
multilateral trade liberalization in terms of improved access to foreign markets for a
country's exports. Whilst this may be a useful means of deflecting domestic opposition
to lifting barriers to imports in that country, it fails to take into account the costs to that
country of its own trade barriers. A great deal of progress has been made by
economists in recent years in identifying and estimating the size of these costs. For
example, with regard to the European Union, a recent study has suggested that the
total costs of its own trade protection policies could amount to as much as 7 per cent
of EU GDP.
6 Similar studies exist for the other major industrialized countries as well
which also point to major costs from trade protection.
7 The costs to countries of their
5 See Magnus Blomstrom and Ari Kokko, “How Foreign Investment Affects Host Countries”, Policy Research Working
Paper No. 1745, World Bank, 1997.
6 See Patrick A. Messerlin, Measuring the Costs of Protection in Europe, Washington, D.C.: Institute for International
Economics, November, 1999. Forthcoming.
7 See Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Kimberly Ann Elliott, Measuring the Costs of Protection in the United States,
Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, January, 1994; and Yoko Sazanami, Shujiro Urata, and Hiroki10
own trade protection policies tend to be a central feature of economic analyses of
multilateral trade liberalization. Economists stress the fact that the greatest part of the
gains which a country can expect from a multilateral trade round usually arise from
reductions in its own trade barriers. Economic studies show that, other things being
equal, countries with higher trade barriers tend to gain more from trade liberalization.
This is why quantitative studies often suggest that the largest potential beneficiaries
from multilateral liberalization may be the developing countries.
8
1.2.2. Another difficulty with the mercantilistic approach to multilateral trade is that it
risks misrepresenting the true internal distributional effect of liberalization. This is
because, whilst it emphasizes the benefits to domestic firms of better access to
foreign markets, it fails to take into account the important welfare gains which trade
liberalization can bring to domestic consumers. Consumers gain from the increased
incentive which trade liberalization creates to substitute inefficient domestic production
with cheaper imports. They may also gain through an increase in the variety of
products which are available and through the fact that trade can curtail the
monopolistic power of domestic firms by subjecting them to increased international
competition. Thus, one essential contribution of economic analysis is to underline the
benefits from trade liberalization to groups whose interests can often be overlooked in
trade negotiations. Economic analysis can therefore help to create a more balanced
view of the gains from trade liberalization.
1.2.3. Trade negotiators rely on economists to provide them with analysis of the
implications of their efforts to reduce trade barriers. Economists have a different
conceptual approach to that adopted by trade negotiators. Trade liberalization for
economists is a positive sum-game, whereas trade negotiators tend to regard it as a
zero-sum game. Economists certainly recognize that they sometimes have a difficult
task in stressing the benefits of trade liberalization to those who do not understand
their approach. The idea of mutual gains from trade is one of the few fundamental
principles on which nearly all economists agree. It is derived from the theory of
comparative advantage, which is one of the most centrally important contributions
which the discipline of economics has made. Nevertheless comparative advantage
remains widely misunderstood even by well informed people.
1.2.4. Although economists have the right conceptual approach to trade
liberalization, they have only imperfect tools with which to make their case. To
illustrate the idea that there can be gains from trade, economists have increasingly
relied on quantitative estimates of the welfare gains which can be realized from
reducing trade barriers. During the Uruguay Round, numerous quantitative studies
predicted large benefits for the global economy from multilateral trade liberalization.
9
Whilst these estimates were useful for illustrative purposes, they have come up
against two major problems. The first problem is that, because they often started out
with somewhat different underlying assumptions, the studies sometimes contradicted
each other over the scale of the gains which could be expected. For example, a study
which assumes immediate liberalization of trade in textiles and clothing is likely to
produce a larger estimate of the welfare gain than one which takes as its starting point
the actual liberalization schedules which countries adopted after the Uruguay Round,
in which barriers to trade are being phased out gradually over a ten-year transition
period. The second problem with quantitative studies of the gains from the Uruguay
Round is there now appears to be a general scepticism about whether the predicted
Kawai, Measuring the Costs of Protection in Japan, Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, January,
1995.
8 See, for example, Hertel and Martin, op. cit.
9 These studies are reviewed in Joseph F. Francois, Bradley McDonald and Håkan Nordström, "A User's Guide to the
Uruguay Round Assessments", Working Paper No. ERAD-96-003, World Trade Organization, 1996.11
welfare gains have genuinely materialized. This is probably explained by the fact that
the greater part of the gains from trade liberalization only arise over the medium-term,
once a process of adjustment to different patterns of production, consumption and
investment has taken place, whereas the public perception at the time the studies
were published may have assumed more immediate gains. An additional factor is that
the welfare gains from trade liberalization which such studies predict are likely to be
thinly diffused across the general population. This contrasts with the adjustment costs
which trade liberalization will entail, which are often concentrated among certain
groups and regions and which are therefore often more visible than the benefits.
Economic models tend not to take adjustment costs into account. The empirical
evidence suggests that, when set against the overall benefits from trade liberalization,
adjustment costs are typically small. The existence of adjustment costs nevertheless
provides a strong argument for countries to develop complementary policies such as
social safety nets and education and retraining policies. There is no way to overcome
the difficulties associated with the economic modelling of trade liberalization. As far as
the first problem is concerned, models are necessarily based on assumptions and
these will almost certainly differ across studies, at least in some respects. Regarding
the second problem, because the models make predictions, they are subject to the
limitations shared by all forecasting exercises. In the present study, an effort has been
made to explain the way in which the various estimates have been derived. The
limiting nature of some of the assumptions underlying the model should be taken into
account when these figures are interpreted.
1.2.5. The figures reported in this paper are intended to illustrate the more
fundamental proposition that there can be welfare gains from further trade reform at
the multilateral level. They are presented towards the end of the paper in order to
emphasize, firstly, the qualitative economic analysis which they are intended to
support. The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the
economic case for launching a new trade round. Section 3 discusses the round in the
context of the global economy, and stresses both the main features of globalization as
well as the link with the environment. Section 4 focuses on the developing countries,
for whom the round will be of crucial importance. Section 5 briefly sets out the
approach used to model the round and section 6 describes the results generated by
the model for the different policy experiments.12
2. The economic case for multilateral trade liberalization
2.1. Trade as an engine of growth
2.1.1. Revitalizing world trade from its current state is essential to restoring and
sustaining balanced growth in the world economy.
10 Throughout the post-war period,
the expansion of international trade has served as one of the engines of the global
economy. Between 1951 and 1997 the volume of world merchandise exports
expanded seventeen-fold, whilst world output quadrupled. Chart 2.1 shows that the
expansion of world trade and output was remarkably strong in the 1950s and 1960s.
The industrialized countries, in particular, experienced particularly high productivity
and real output growth, and countries that recorded a high rate of output growth also
experienced large increases in trade growth. Although the links between trade and
growth are complex, it is generally agreed that key policy initiatives in the
industrialized economies, such as the cuts in tariffs and non-tariff barriers from the
very high levels of the inter-war period and the widespread move towards currency
convertibility for current account transactions, contributed to these developments.
Chart 2.1. Growth of world trade and output, 1951-1999
Source: various.
2.1.2. During the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, trend productivity and output
growth slowed significantly in the industrialized countries, as did the growth of trade.
This period witnessed the collapse of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system,
oil and commodity price shocks and the onset of the debt crisis. The large tariff
reductions undertaken in the 1950s may have had their main impact in the previous
two decades and therefore provided less stimulus to trade and growth in this period. In
addition, many countries partly reversed their previous policy stance by erecting
significant non-tariff barriers. This last factor is often cited as providing at least a
partial explanation for the slowdown in the rate of expansion of world trade in this
period.
10 This point is emphasized by the IMF in its latest World Economic Outlook. See IMF, World Economic Outlook,
October, 1999.
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2.1.3. In the period from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, the growth of world trade
rebounded. A significant development over this period was the increase in the share
of developing countries in world trade. This reflects the policy shift which took place in
an increasing number of developing countries away from previous inward-oriented
development strategies towards a greater openness to foreign trade and investment
flows. Not only did many developing countries emerge as major suppliers on world
markets for a wide range of products, but they were increasingly serving as a
“locomotive” for the world economy through their large and rising share of world import
demand. East Asian developing countries were particularly important in this last
respect. In value terms, East Asian developing countries doubled their share of world
imports from 10 per cent to 20 per cent between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s.
11
2.1.4. In 1997, the rate of increase in the volume of world exports reached an
impressive 10 per cent – the highest annual increase in trade volumes for around
twenty years. In contrast, the last two years have witnessed a slump in trade volumes
and a more subdued rate of world output growth. The rate of increase in the volume of
world merchandise exports in 1998 fell to only 3.5 per cent – the lowest rate of
increase of international trade for thirteen years. The principle explanation for this
slowdown was the economic contraction in much of Asia – previously one of the most
dynamic regions in world trade – due to the East Asian financial crisis and the
continuing recession in Japan. In 1998, import volumes fell by 22 per cent in the five
East Asian crisis countries (Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand)
and by around 8 per cent in Japan. The Russian and Brazilian crises, and their
associated spillovers, further added to the depressed state of world import demand.
2.1.5. The recent slump in world trade has had a somewhat different impact on
industrialized and developing countries. Outside of Japan, the major industrialized
countries have proved remarkably resilient to the slowdown. Indeed, the strong
performance of the United States economy has undoubtedly been an important factor
in sustaining world import demand. In the majority of developing countries, however,
the slowdown in world trade growth has been more detrimental. This is particularly
true for commodity exporters, who have suffered important terms-of-trade losses
following the slump in world commodity prices. Despite these difficulties, the world
economy now seems to be recovering. In particular the prospects for export-led
recoveries in many developing countries now look more solid. A crucial factor in
helping to restore broad-based, sustainable growth in the crisis countries and the rest
of the world has been the resolve which most countries have shown to maintain open
markets. Protectionist pressures have nevertheless been mounting, especially since
the uneven pattern of growth among the industrialized countries has exacerbated
external payments imbalances. Under these circumstances, the launch of a new
trade round could help to contain protectionism by continuing the momentum
for ongoing liberalization.
2.2. Why trade is beneficial
2.2.1. There are a number of reasons why the expansion of world trade has a
favourable impact on world growth. In line with the principle of comparative
advantage, trade leads to a more efficient allocation of scarce resources across
productive activities in different countries. In traditional growth models, this leads to a
higher level of output by stimulating higher savings and investment. More recently,
economists have stressed the fact that trade can also lead to a permanent increase in
the rate of growth. This can occur because trade facilitates the exploitation of
11 East Asian developing countries are defined here as China, Hong Kong and Taipei plus Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia,
the Philippines and Thailand.14
economies of scale, stimulates competition, and can lead to the transmission of
technology and knowledge. The relationship between trade and growth is complex,
however, and it is difficult to resolve the issue of whether increased trade
unambiguously causes higher growth. Nevertheless, there is at least mounting
circumstantial evidence to support such claims (see Box 1).
2.2.2. One of the most fundamental insights in the whole of economics is that
there can be gains from trade. First and foremost, "classic" efficiency gains arise
from improved possibilities for specialization and exchange. Gains from specialization
arise because of the increased efficiency of resource allocation. By allowing countries
to specialize in those goods which they are relatively well adapted to produce, trade
can lead to an increase in the global production of all goods. Suppose, for some
reason or other, that Europe can produce motor cars at a lower price than India, whilst
India can produce garments at lower price than Europe. International trade allows the
global production of both cars and garments to increase, since Europe can specialize
in producing only cars whilst India can specialize in the manufacture of garments. This
is a rather restrictive example, since each country has an absolute advantage in either
cars or garments. Suppose, however, that Europe can produce both cars and
garments at a lower price than India. The principle of comparative advantage states
that there can still be gains from trade. If the price advantage which Europe enjoys
over India is greater in cars than in garments, it will still be beneficial for Europe to
channel its resources into the production of cars and for India to again specialize in
garments. In this way, global production of both cars and garments will still increase.
Trade based on comparative advantage is therefore more efficient than an absence of
trade because it increases the world’s production possibilities. Gains from exchange
result from an improvement in the world's consumption possibilities. If Brazil has a
comparative advantage in coffee and China has a comparative advantage in tea, then
international trade will allow consumers in each country to purchase more of the other
good at a lower price.
2.2.3. Comparative advantage typically gives rise to inter-industry trade – trade
between different countries in the products of different industries. Although this sort of
trade is mutually beneficial, it can also be associated with adjustment costs as some
factors of production will have to move out of inefficient uses into more efficient ones.
As labour and capital move between different sectors, they may be unemployed for
some time. This is especially true in countries where labour and capital markets do not
operate very efficiently or where workers face obstacles to acquiring new skills. In any
event, trade liberalization can facilitate the adjustment process by creating new
opportunities in export-oriented sectors which can absorb some of the factors of
production released by import-competing activities. The adjustment costs from inter-
industry trade must therefore be set against the overall gains from trade liberalization.
There is strong empirical evidence to suggest that adjustment costs typically
represent only a small fraction of the overall benefits associated with trade
liberalization.
12 Nevertheless, since adjustment costs may be non-trivial for certain
groups and regions, countries may need to develop adequate social safety nets and
education and retraining policies in order to cushion the short-run negative impact of
trade liberalization.
12 A recent survey of more than fifty empirical studies on the adjustment costs of trade liberalization was undertaken by
Matusz and Tarr (1999). They found that virtually all the studies which quantified the adjustment costs relative to the
overall benefits found the former to be small relative to the latter. There are a number of explanations for this. For
example, the costs are typically short-term and end when displaced workers find new jobs, whereas the benefits of
trade liberalization grow as the economy does. In addition, normal labour turnover in many industries exceeds
dislocation from trade liberalization. This suggests that the adjustment process following trade liberalization need not
entail much forced unemployment. See Steven J. Matusz and David G. Tarr, "Adjusting to Trade Policy Reform",
Policy Research Working Paper No. 2142, World Bank, 1999.15
2.2.4. Inter-industry usually trade takes place when there are differences between
countries (e.g. in technology or their relative endowments of capital and labour).
However, the largest share of world trade is between the industrialized countries,
where such differences are less apparent. Trade between the industrialized countries
is therefore more likely to be intra-industry trade – trade in similar, possibly
differentiated products. Intra-industry trade is associated with economies of scale
(also referred to as increasing returns to scale), when production is more efficient the
larger the scale at which it takes place. It also does not usually give rise to the same
sort of adjustment costs as inter-industry trade, since resources will be reallocated
within sectors rather than between them. When there are economies of scale, both the
variety of goods that a country can produce and the scale of its production are
constrained by the size of the domestic market. International trade allows countries to
loosen these constraints by taking advantage of an integrated world market that is
bigger than any individual national market. Each country can then specialize in
producing a narrower range of products than it would in the absence of trade and, by
importing those goods which it does not itself produce, each country can
simultaneously increase the variety of goods available to its consumers. As a result,
when economies of scale are present, international trade offers an opportunity
for mutual gain even when countries are similar in terms of their technology or
factor endowments. Furthermore, this can lead to a permanent increase in a
country's growth rate (see Box 1).
2.2.5. The presence of economies of scale implies that firms are operating in an
environment which is imperfectly competitive. This means that they will typically
restrict their output and raise their prices in order to achieve higher profits. The greater
the degree of market power exercised by firms, the more they will be able to do this.
Under such circumstances, international trade can be beneficial by generating
pro-competitive effects. Trade can discipline domestic producers by reducing their
degree of market power. The stronger presence of foreign firms on domestic markets
will induce domestic incumbent firms to lower prices and increase output. This
generates benefits to domestic consumers. Domestic producers may also benefit in a
similar way in relation to imported inputs. Empirical evidence confirms the intuition that
increased exposure to international trade does indeed lower price-cost margins, thus
enhancing the degree of competition in markets which are so exposed.
13 Another
beneficial effect of trade is that it can encourage innovation. In traditional growth
models, the long-run growth level is determined outside the model by exogenous
technological progress. This means that there is no possibility for trade to increase a
country's permanent growth rate by stimulating technological change. This is
extremely limiting, and newer models of endogenous growth explicitly allow for the
fact that trade may also stimulate growth by promoting technological progress
through the transfer of technology and the diffusion of knowledge. Technology
and knowledge which are embodied in good and services may often only be able to
cross borders through trade and foreign direct investment flows.
14
13 In the EU, this pro-competitive role seems to be played more by extra-EU imports. See Alexis Jacquemin and André
Sapir, “Competition and Imports in the European Market” in L. Alan Winters and Anthony Venables (eds.), European
Integration: Trade and Industry, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press and Centre for Economic Policy Research,
1991. A similar pro-competitive effect has been found in developing countries which have opened up to international
trade. See, for example, Pravin Krishna and Devashish Mitra, "Trade Liberalization, Market Discipline and Productivity
Growth: New Evidence from India", Journal Of Development Economics, (56)2 , pp. 447-462, 1998.
14 See Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy, Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1991.16
Box 1: Trade and growth
In traditional, neo-classical growth models the long-term growth rate is explained by
exogenously-determined technological progress.
15 Trade liberalization, by generating
resources for increased investment, can raise the level of output but not its long-term growth
rate. The reason is that these models assume constant returns to scale at the aggregate level
to all inputs and, hence, diminishing returns to capital. Consequently, each addition to a
country's capital stock will generate diminishing amounts of extra output. By emphasizing only
a one-off, comparative static increase in output, such models may significantly underestimate
the potential impact of trade on growth. In so-called endogenous growth models, on the other
hand, trade may permanently increase economic growth.
16 Rather than treating technological
progress as an unexplained external, these models allow for it to be determined endogenously.
They also relax the assumption of constant returns to scale at the aggregate level. There are a
number of different ways in which trade can then permanently raise economic growth. Firstly,
since technology and knowledge are often embodied in traded goods and services, greater
exposure to trade can promote technological progress and allow countries to economize on
research and development activities. Secondly, by promoting the international integration of
increasing returns sectors, trade can raise output without requiring additional inputs. Thirdly,
trade promotes economic efficiency by encouraging resources to be reallocated across sectors
in line with comparative advantage. Rather than simply treating this as leading to lead to a one-
off increase in output, the new growth models allow for the fact that greater efficiency can free
extra resources for research and development activities.
Despite these theoretical advances, the links between trade and growth are not straightforward
at an empirical level. Many studies find an association between openness to trade and growth,
but they come up against two central difficulties. The first is establishing an acceptable
measure of trade openness. Typically, there are a myriad of variables (average tariffs, non-
tariff barriers, the black market exchange rate premium) which can influence whether or not a
country is open to trade. Combining these different variables into a single index of trade
openness is not easy. Sachs and Warner (1995) conducted a study of per capita income
growth in 89 developing countries over the period from 1970 to 1989.
17 They found that
average per capita income growth per annum in open economies exceeded that in economies
which were not always open by nearly four percentage points. However, a problem with this
study is that it is based on a somewhat arbitrary definition of what constitutes a closed
economy (e.g. one with a black market exchange rate premium of at least fifty per cent). The
second difficulty relates to causality. As pointed out by Rodrik (1995), even if one accepts the
association between openness to trade and growth, this does not imply that greater openness
causes higher growth.
18 Those countries which adopt liberal trade policies may also adopt
sound macroeconomic policies or have better functioning institutions or invest more in
education and training. How can one disentangle the contribution of trade openness from
these other factors? A recent attempt to overcome this difficulty is provided by Frankel and
Romer (1999), who use countries' geographical characteristics to study the effects of trade on
income.
19 These characteristics are unlikely to be correlated with other determinants of
income. Their study suggests that a one per cent rise in the ratio of trade to GDP increases per
capita income by at least half a percentage point. This and other studies should nevertheless
be taken as strengthening the case for the benefits of trade rather than providing decisive
evidence for it.
15 The traditional, neo-classical growth model is derived from Robert M. Solow, "A Contribution to the Theory of
Economic Growth", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 70, pp65-94, 1954.
16 See, for example, Paul M. Romer, "Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth", Journal of Political Economy, 94,
pp1002-37, 1986; and "Endogenous Technological Change", Journal of Political Economy, 98, ppS71-102, 1990.
17 See Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew Warner, "Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integration", Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, 1, pp1-118, 1995.
18 See Dani Rodrik, "Getting Interventions Right: How South Korea and Taiwan Grew Rich", Economic Policy,2 0 ,
pp53-97, 1999.
19 See Jeffrey A. Frankel and David Romer, "Does Trade Cause Growth?", American Economic Review, 89, pp379-
399, 1999.17
2.3. Why protection is costly
2.3.1. Trade distortions, such as tariffs, quotas and subsidies, result first and
foremost in a cost to the country that imposes them. These distortions shift the
economy to a less efficient mix of production, consumption and investment. The
imposition of a tariff, for example, leads to both a production distortion and a
consumption distortion. The former arises because the tariff causes more of domestic
demand to be met from domestic supply than would be the case without the tariff. The
latter arises because the tariff leads to a lower level of consumption than would be the
case without the tariff. Furthermore, countries typically have non-uniform tariff
structures, which distort the pattern of incentives to produce and invest between
different sectors. With regard to import quotas, these are not necessarily equivalent in
their effects to import tariffs. There are two main reasons for this. Firstly, a quota
generates a scarcity rent because of the fact that restricted sales take place at higher
prices. The effects on income distribution can be quite different from the case of a
tariff which generates revenue for the government. Secondly, quotas are much more
rigid instruments than tariffs. Suppose that the world price of the imported good falls.
A tariff allows the domestic price to fall so that domestic consumers benefit. Under a
quota, on the other hand, the only benefit may go to domestic importers who can
capture more quota rents. The costs associated with a country's own trade restrictions
need to be taken into account by its trade negotiators. Although countries usually
approach multilateral trade negotiations with the objective of seeking improved
access to each other's markets, most of the gains which they can expect to
achieve come from removing their own trade barriers.
2.3.2. An important lesson from the theory of international trade is that a tax on
imports is also a tax on exports. Thus, another reason why import protection is
harmful is that it results in an anti-export bias, as resources are pulled away from
exporting sectors into sectors which produce for the protected domestic market.
Import substitution policies may also have contributed to an over-appreciation of the
real exchange rate in many developing countries. This, coupled with the general pull
of resources out of exporting industries into import-competing industries, contributed
to the slowdown in many developing countries' foreign exchange earnings. As a
result, these policies were widely blamed for contributing to periodic foreign exchange
crises. Since the mid-1980s the trend has been for developing countries to reverse
these policies and adopt an outward-oriented strategy with a more neutral pattern of
incentives between exporting and competing for the domestic market. Nevertheless,
many developing countries are still paying a very high price for the mistakes of the
past.
20
2.3.3. An additional source of the costs associated with restrictive trade policies arise
from what is known as the "political economy" of protection. Inefficient trade policies
often come about because economic agents have spent resources to lobby for them.
Resources spent on so-called "rent-seeking" behaviour cannot be used for productive
activities. Rent-seeking may therefore be classified as a form of directly-unproductive
profit-seeking (DUP) activities.
21 The costs of rent-seeking behaviour associated with
trade protection are additional to inefficiencies already discussed. Empirical research
suggests that this cost may be very high for some countries.
22 Nevertheless, it is usual
to exclude the benefits from reduced rent-seeking in estimates of the welfare gains
from trade liberalization.
20 For a review of these policies see Anne O. Krueger, "Trade Policies in Developing Countries" in Ronald W. Jones
and Peter B. Kenen, Handbook of International Economics, volume 1, Amsterdam: North Holland, 1984.
21 Jagdish N. Bhagwati, "Directly Unproductive Profit-Seeking Activities", Journal of Political Economy, 90, pp988-
1002, 1982.
22 Krueger (1974) estimated the welfare cost of protectionist rent-seeking for import quotas in India during the late
1960s to have amounted to 7 per cent of GDP. See Anne O. Krueger, "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking
Society", American Economic Review, 64, pp291-303, 1974.18
3. The global economy: some economic considerations
3.1. Trade and globalization
3.1.1. The trend towards globalization – the process “by which markets and
production in different countries are becoming increasingly interdependent due to the
dynamics of trade in goods and services and flows of capital and technology” – is
undoubtedly one of the key features of the evolving world economy.
23 Globalization is
often measured by looking at how much faster world trade expands compared to
world output. This gives an indication of the increasing degree to which national
economies rely on international trade. On this basis, the evidence suggests that
globalization has been occurring for the past two hundred and fifty years, with the brief
exception of the inter-war period. However, the speed of globalization also seems to
have increased in the 1990s. Between 1980 and 1989, the average annual growth
rate of the volume of world merchandise exports was 3.8 per cent, whilst world output
grew on average by 2.6 per cent (implying a ratio of trade to output growth of less than
one and a half). Between 1990 and 1997, however, the volume growth of world
merchandise exports averaged 6.5 per cent, whilst the average growth of world GDP
was 1.8 per cent (implying a ratio of trade to output growth of just under three and
three-quarters). The increase in the speed of globalization over the course of the
1990s has led to a greater recognition on the part of governments of the need to
develop coherent policies to deal with some of the challenges which
globalization can bring and to ensure a more equitable distribution of the
benefits which are associated with it. It is also argued that as a consequence of
globalization there is a need for multilateral discipline to extend beyond trade in goods
and services to rules covering competition and investment. Some key features of the
globalization phenomenon are explored in this sub-section.
3.1.2. As part of the trend towards globalization, the past decade has witnessed an
increasing internationalization of the production process. This has been driven
largely by reductions in transport costs, improvements in communications and a
growing preference for liberal trade and investment environments among countries.
However, with rapid technological change in the 1990s, modern manufactures have
become increasingly sophisticated and their production can be broken down into ever
more stages. This "slicing up of the value chain" is now taking place on a much more
global basis. The extent of global production sharing over the past decade can be
assessed from the fact that trade in components and parts within the machinery and
transport equipment category has been growing faster than finished goods in this
sector. It is also estimated that in the mid-1990s some 30 per cent of world
manufacturing trade is accounted for by such semi-finished goods.
24 It is therefore
increasingly inappropriate to think of modern products as having a distinct national
identity. The increasing internationalization of production has been accompanied by a
similar expansion in the tradability of services. Given the rising service-intensity of
production in general, access to efficient services will be increasingly important in
promoting economic growth in both industrialized and developing countries.
3.1.3. One of the key developments in the world economy during the 1990s has been
the growing importance of developing countries as producers and exporters of
manufactures. Developing countries now account for around 20 per cent of world
manufacturing output, compared to around 12 per cent in 1970. Over the period 1990
to 1997, industrialized countries’ imports of manufactures from developing countries
grew faster than their total merchandise imports from all third countries. The progress
23 The definition of globalization used here is taken from OECD, Intra-Firm Trade, 1993, p7.
24 See Alexander Yeats, “Just How Big is Global Production Sharing?”, Policy Research Working Paper No. 1871,
World Bank, 1998.19
of developing countries in this respect has, of course, been extremely uneven. The
newly-industrializing economies (NIEs) have been the pioneers, given their early head
start in pursuing export-led industrialization. On the other hand, many of the least-
developed countries, particularly those in sub-Saharan Africa, continue to play only a
very limited role in international trade and enjoy only a marginal share of the benefits
of globalization. This issue is examined in more detail in section 4.
3.1.4. In the industrialized economies, increased trade competition from the
developing countries has not been without some frictions. This factor has been
blamed for the growth of wage dispersion between skilled and unskilled workers in the
United States, and for the rise in unemployment among unskilled workers in Western
Europe. However, the economic evidence does not support the view that trade with
developing countries has been a significant factor behind the deteriorating labour
market position of unskilled workers in the industrialized countries.
25 Part of the
reason may be that whilst wages are lower in the developing world than in the
industrialized countries, so are productivity levels. The empirical research suggests
that the main factor behind the worsening labour market situation of unskilled workers
in the industrialized countries is technological change which requires a more skilled
labour force.
26 Structural impediments to the operation of labour markets are likely to
hinder a country’s ability to adapt to these developments. The appropriate policy
response in most industrialized countries may therefore require a combination of
structural reforms and the implementation of adequate social safety nets and other
flanking policies to cushion the impact of these developments on those who find it
most difficult to adjust.
3.1.5. It is clear that the rapid pace of technological change is playing a key role in
the continuing evolution of the global economy. Not only has technology facilitated
increased flows of trade and investment, it is also reshaping the ways in which firms
and customers interact. Nowhere is this more evident than in the growth of electronic
commerce. This is a fundamentally new way of conducting business which has
shrunk the distance between consumers and producers and created the need for new
forms of intermediaries (traditional wholesalers and retailers are replaced by network
access providers and electronic payment systems). There is currently no international
legal framework for such transactions. However, it is estimated that the share of
value-added that potentially lends itself to electronic commerce is around 30 per cent
of GDP.
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3.1.6. Another important development in the modern global economy is the
explosive growth of international capital flows and financial transactions.
International transactions in bonds and equities in major industrialized countries
increased to well over 100 per cent of GDP in 1995 compared with less than 10 per
cent in 1980. In many developing countries, the trend towards liberalization of capital
markets has also contributed to higher investment, faster growth, and increased living
standards (net private capital flows to developing countries increased to more than
$150 billion a year during 1995-97, compared with around $50 billion a year during
1987-89). However, the recent experience of Mexico, the East Asian countries, Russia
and Brazil illustrates the fact that capital-market liberalization needs to proceed in an
25 The evidence as far as the European Union is concerned is reviewed in the chapter on ‘Trade, Investment and
Employment’ in European Commission, The European Union as a World Trade Partner, European Economy Reports
and Studies, No. 3, 1997.
26 For example, studies have shown that in Europe, workers’ individual characteristics, such as skill level, appear to
play the dominant role in explaining long-term unemployment. See Mathias Dewatripont, André Sapir and Khalid
Sekkat, “Labour Market Effects of Trade with LDCs in Europe” in Mathias Dewatripont, André Sapir and Khalid Sekkat
(eds.), Trade and Jobs in Europe: Much Ado About Nothing, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
27 See Ludger Schuknecht and Rosa Pérez-Esteve, "A Quantitative Assessment of Electronic Commerce", Working
Paper No. ERAD-99-01, World Trade Organization, 1999.20
orderly, properly sequenced manner. When this is not the case, removing capital
controls can be costly for countries, since it can expose weak corporate governance,
poor management and inadequate supervision of financial sectors, and, possibly, an
inconsistent macroeconomic framework. The complementary relationship between
capital-market liberalization and other structural reforms is highlighted by the fact that
there is strong evidence that the liberalization of financial services can result in less
distorted and less volatile capital flows, and can thereby promote financial stability.
28
3.1.7. One particularly interesting feature of the recent increase in international
capital flows has been the growth of foreign direct investment (FDI). In 1997, the
world stock of FDI was around $3.5 trillion.
29 In recent years the ratio of the volume of
world FDI stocks to world GDP has grown twice as fast as the ratio of world trade to
world GDP. The expansion of international production, through FDI by multinational
corporations (MNCs), has therefore deepened the integration of the world economy
beyond that achieved by international trade alone. The industrialized countries
obviously dominate global FDI flows, accounting for more than two-thirds of the world
inward FDI stock and around nine-tenths of the outward stock. However, developing
countries have been increasing their share in these flows. Much of the increase in FDI
inflows to developing countries is, of course, linked to export-oriented manufacturing
activities. There is evidence that FDI inflows promote economic development by
stimulating productivity growth and boosting exports in the host country.
30 In the
modern global economy, FDI is increasingly associated with intra-firm flows of goods
and services and with inter-firm alliances of various kinds. Related to this is the
importance of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As), which now account
for the bulk of FDI flows. In 1997, world-wide cross-border M&A transactions
amounted to some $342 billion. The dramatic increase in M&A activities in recent
years is explained by the strategic considerations of MNCs, but liberalization and de-
regulation (e.g. the conclusion of the WTO financial services negotiations in
December 1997) have also played a significant role.
3.2. Trade and the environment
3.2.1. As the pace of globalization has increased in the 1990s, policy makers have
also been confronted by increased public concern about the impact that trade
liberalization may have on other policy areas. One such area is the environment,
where the WTO has been required to mediate in disputes concerning trade-related
measures taken by governments for environmental purposes and where there has
also been much discussion about the interface between international trade rules and
the provisions of different multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). More
generally, the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment has been mandated to
“identify the relationship between trade measures and environmental measures in
order to promote sustainable development”. It is important to stress that as trade
liberalization has been a powerful engine for the growth of the global economy, it has
helped to make available the resources which are needed to advance environmental
protection and promote sustainable development. In contrast, trade barriers and
domestic policy distortions have constrained the development potential of many
countries and led to serious environmental spill-overs.
3.2.2. Thus far, there is little evidence to support the view that trade liberalization is
incompatible with countries’ sustainable development. On the contrary, trade
28 See Masamichi Kono and Ludger Schuknecht, “Financial Services Trade, Capital Flows and Financial Stability”,
Working Paper No. ERAD-98-12, World Trade Organization, 1998.
29 Figures in this paragraph are drawn from United Nations, World Investment Report: Trends and Determinants, 1998.
30 See Magnus Blomstrom and Ari Kokko, “How Foreign Investment Affects Host Countries”, Policy Research Working
Paper No. 1745, World Bank, 1997.21
liberalization may provide an important means of decreasing pollution levels. There
are three reasons why this may be so. Firstly, trade liberalization can reduce
economic distortions which may encourage pollution. For example, one area where
environmental problems seem to have risen in recent years is agriculture. The
environmental effects of producing additional food to support the world's growing
population are influenced by the incentives available to farmers. In many countries,
these incentives are distorted by government policies (e.g. tariffs and subsidies). The
overuse of agricultural chemicals could be limited by appropriate changes in these
policies (e.g. reductions in export subsidies). In addition, reducing tariff escalation in
the industrialized countries can relieve pressure on developing countries to specialize
only in exploiting their natural resources. Secondly, open economies may be more
likely to adopt clean and efficient technologies. One of the reasons why this is so is
that increased trade is likely to promote the diffusion of pollution abatement
technology and cleaner production techniques. Thirdly, poverty may be at the core of
many environmental problems – a clean environment may be too much of a luxury for
poorer countries. Insofar as trade promotes economic development, it will contribute
considerably to the demand for a clean environment and will also provide the
resources to meet this demand. Indeed, if one believes that there is an income-
dependent path of pollution that eventually turns downward as countries reach a
certain level of development, then increased trade may be essential for tackling
environmental problems in poorer countries.
31 It would be wrong, however, to assume
that there is an automatic positive link between trade and the environment. Trade
liberalization, by promoting economic growth, may be linked to associated
environmental problems such as increased CO2 emissions. To avert the possibility of
global warming, current emission trends in many countries will have to be reversed
through the use of efficient instruments. Trade barriers will rarely be efficient
instruments for dealing with such problems, but there would seem to be a need for
better multilateral rules for the environment.
3.2.3. The present paper focuses on the economic impact of a new trade round.
Thus, the implications of a round for countries' sustainable development is not a
central concern of this paper. Instead, it is explored in more detail in a separate
Sustainable Impact Assessment conducted for the European Commission.
32
31 In other words, there may be an Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC), so that pollution increases at the early stages
of development but decreases after a certain income level has been reached. The literature on the EKC is reviewed in
Håkan Nordström and Scott Vaughan, Trade and Environment, WTO Special Studies, 4, World Trade Organization,
1999.
32 See Colin Kirkpatrick, Norman Lee and Oliver Morrissey, "WTO New Round Sustainability Impact Assessment
Study", 2 volumes, paper prepared for the European Commission, forthcoming.22
4. Multilateral trade liberalization and the developing countries
4.1. The developing countries in previous trade rounds
4.1.1. In principle, developing countries should be among the main beneficiaries of a
multilateral trade round. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, their exports tend to
face higher trade barriers than those of the industrialized countries, and so they have
more to gain from multilateral reductions in protection. Secondly, their own levels of
import protection tend to be higher than those of the industrialized countries. By
reducing these levels of protection, they can therefore benefit from a reallocation of
resources away from inefficient sectors towards those in which they have a
comparative advantage. Until relatively recently, however, the developing countries
have not been important actors in multilateral trade negotiations. In the Kennedy
and Tokyo Rounds, for example, virtually all the liberalization commitments were
made by the industrialized countries. Not only were most developing countries not
members of the GATT/WTO, but the majority were pursuing import-substitution
policies and were consequently reluctant to dismantle trade barriers. This began to
change in the early to mid-1980s, as an increasing number of developing countries
began to adopt a more outward-oriented strategy. Nevertheless, the significant trade
opening which these countries started to implement was usually based on unilateral
liberalization, typically as part of structural adjustment programmes supported by the
World Bank and the IMF, rather than on multilateral liberalization at the GATT/WTO.
The fact that they were not major players in multilateral trade negotiations had both
advantages and disadvantages for the developing countries. On the one hand, the
most-favoured nation (MFN) principle allowed them to "free ride" on other countries'
tariff concessions. On the other hand, their lack of participation in multilateral trade
rounds may have encouraged the industrialized countries to leave the sectors of
greatest interest to the developing countries out of the negotiations.
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4.1.2. The Uruguay Round marked the first occasion in which the developing
countries were significantly involved in multilateral trade negotiations. Sectors which
were of key interest to developing countries featured prominently. One such sector
was textiles and clothing, where developing countries secured a phase-out over a ten-
year time horizon of the bilateral export restraints agreed under the Multifibre
Arrangement (MFA).
34 In agriculture, developing country interests were split between
agricultural exporters, who favoured a liberalization of world agricultural trade, and
food importers, who were concerned about the potential negative impact of a
reduction in industrialized countries' export subsidies on their terms-of-trade. In the
end, however, the extent of actual liberalization of agriculture was quite limited.
35 With
33 Panagariya (1999) suggests that this was one reason why the Multifibre Arrangement lasted as long as it did. See
Arvind Panagariya, "The Millennium Round and the Developing Countries: Negotiating Strategies and Areas of
Benefits", paper presented at the Conference on Developing Countries and the New Multilateral Round of Trade
Negotiations, Harvard University, 5-6 November, 1999.
34 Opinions differ as to whether or not this can be regarded as a successful outcome for the developing countries,
given that the progress achieved thus far in actual liberalization by many importing countries has not lived up to the
expectations of some developing countries. Finger and Schuknecht (1999), for example, argue that "The agreement to
remove MFA-based quantitative restrictions on imports of textiles and clothing is of itself a major accomplishment"
(p1). However, they then go on to examine the actual implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Textiles
and Clothing (ATC) and find that most importing countries have weighted liberalization towards products that were not
previously restrained. The complaints of many developing countries as far as implementation of the ATC are
summarized by Croome (1998): "They (the developing countries) feel that the importing countries…have disregarded
the spirit of the agreement by applying its letter in ways that have brought little or no liberalization so far… They fear
that so much liberalization is being left to the final years of the transition period that full integration may in fact not be
achieved", (p23). See J. Michael Finger and Ludger Schuknecht, "Market Access Advances and Retreats: the Uruguay
Round and Beyond", paper presented at the WTO/World Bank Conference on Developing Countries and the
Millennium Round, Geneva, 21-22 September, 1999; and John Croome, "The Present Outlook for Trade Negotiations
in the World Trade Organization", Policy Research Working Paper No. 1992, World Bank, 1998.
35 Ingco (1995) notes that the "tariffication" of non-tariff barriers in agriculture was a major achievement of the Uruguay
Round. However, the extent of actual liberalization was limited by binding tariffs to the base period of 1986-1988 (a
period when border protection was historically high) and by the problem of "dirty tariffication" (in many countries the
new base tariffs resulted in higher protection than the non-tariff barriers they replaced). See Merlinda Ingco,23
regard to industrial tariffs, the Uruguay Round resulted in a considerable increase in
bindings by developing countries (the share of developing countries’ imports of
industrial products under bound tariffs rose from 14% to 59%). Developing countries
also made significant tariff cuts.
36 However, calculations indicate that in terms of tariff
concessions received, they may have done less well than the industrialized
countries.
37 Despite these factors, the evidence suggests that the developing
countries did make significant gains from the Uruguay Round.
38 These gains probably
exceeded what could reasonably have been expected before the negotiations
began.
39 Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the developing countries did not make the
most of the opportunities which the Uruguay Round presented.
4.1.3. A further difficulty in the Uruguay Round was the weak participation of the
least-developed countries. For example, it has been calculated that of all the written
proposals and comments circulated at the WTO during the Uruguay Round, less than
3 per cent were submitted by sub-Saharan African countries.
40 Part of the explanation
for this is that most sub-Saharan African countries have only a minimal representation
at the WTO's headquarters in Geneva.
41 In addition, officials from the least-developed
countries' often lacked technical expertise in the new topics which were included on
the Uruguay Round agenda (e.g. customs valuation, intellectual property rights,
sanitary and phytosanitary measures). It is also argued that many least-developed
countries may have accepted commitments under the Uruguay Round without fully
comprehending their development implications. For example, estimates suggest that
for many least-developed countries, the administrative cost of implementing new WTO
rules emerging from the Uruguay Round agreements may have amounted to the
equivalent of a year's development budget.
42 This is not to suggest that the least-
developed countries cannot gain from adopting new WTO rules, but that if such rules
are to make a difference they must be accompanied by the infrastructure and
institutions which are needed to facilitate development. Trade negotiators in the next
round will need to address this issue, perhaps by increasing the coherence between
the work of the WTO and that of the IMF and the World Bank. The least-developed
"Agricultural Trade Liberalization in the Uruguay Round: One Step Forward, One Step Back?", Policy Research
Working Paper No. 1500, World Bank, 1995.
36 Finger and Schuknecht (1999) calculate that tariff cuts by developing countries were actually deeper than those of
the industrialized countries. Nevertheless, developing countries' bound rates are still substantially higher than those of
the industrialized countries and they also have a larger gap between their bound and applied rates.
37 See Finger and Schuknecht (1999), op. cit.
38 Studies put the purely static gains for developing countries from the Uruguay Round at around 3 and 4 per cent of
GDP. These static gains are likely to be dwarfed by longer-run, dynamic gains. See Joseph F. Francois, Bradley J.
McDonald and Håkan Nordström, "The Uruguay Round: A Numerically Based Qualitative Assessment", in Will Martin
and L. Alan Winters (eds.), The Uruguay Round and the Developing Economies, World Bank Discussion Papers No.
307, 1995; and Glenn W. Harrison, Thomas F. Rutherford and David G. Tarr, "Quantifying the Uruguay Round" in
Martin and Winters (op. cit.).
39 See, for example, Anne O. Kreuger, "Developing Countries and the Next Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations",
Policy Research Working Paper No. 2118, World Bank, 1999.
40 See E. Olawale Ogunkola, "African Capacity for Compliance and Defence of WTO Rights", paper presented at the
African Economic Research Consortium Conference on Africa and the World Trading System, Yaounde, Cameroon,
17-18 April, 1999.
41 19 of 42 African WTO member countries have no permanent trade representative at the WTO headquarters in
Geneva. In contrast, the average number of permanent Geneva-based trade staff for OECD countries is seven, whilst
the average for all developing countries is three and a half. Source: World Bank, Entering the 21
st Century – World
Development Report 1999/2000, Oxford: World Bank, 2000.
42 Finger and Schuler (1999) review World Bank project experience in the areas of customs reform, the application of
sanitary and phytosanitary standards, and the installation of systems of intellectual property rights. They argue that the
scope of what the WTO regulates is narrower than what must be done to encourage development. For example, they
contrast customs valuation with customs reform, arguing that it is of little help to change customs valuation procedures
if containers stay on the dock for sixty days. They also argue that the WTO reforms generated no sense of "ownership"
among the least-developed countries. Instead, they were seen as being imposed by the major trading powers.
However, World Bank experience in developing countries highlights the importance of ownership of reforms by the
government and the population if they are to have a chance of long-term success. See J. Michael Finger and Philip
Schuler, "Implementation of Uruguay Round Commitments: the Development Challenge", paper presented at the
WTO/World Bank Conference on Developing Countries and the Millennium Round, Geneva, 21-22 September, 1999.24
countries themselves could also consider pooling their negotiating resources in future
negotiations.
4.2. Have the developing countries been marginalized?
4.2.1. Concerns about the participation of the least-developed countries in the WTO
are, in part, a reflection of a wider debate about whether or not developing countries
have benefited from the exceptional increase in global trade and investment flows in
recent years. Some have argued that globalization has not benefited the developing
countries at all, but has instead led to their marginalization. This claim is based on the
perception that global trade and investment flows are becoming increasingly
concentrated. With the notable exception of East Asia, many developing regions have
seen their share of world trade decline over recent decades. For example, Sub-
Saharan Africa's share has fallen from around 3 per cent in the mid-1970s to around 1
per cent today. However, this is to ignore the fact that absolute levels of trade (and
investment) flows have increased enormously. Thus, even developing regions
which have seen their relative share in world trade decline have experienced an
increase in absolute trade. A recent study shows that, if one corrects for the
increase in the absolute levels of trade, the concentration of world trade has actually
fallen strongly over the period from 1976 to 1995.
43 Furthermore, trade concentration
has fallen amongst relatively open economies but has risen amongst relatively closed
economies. This suggests that the weak participation of some developing regions in
the global economy may instead be due to inadequate domestic policy environments.
Many least-developed countries, in particular, suffer from unstable, unpredictable and
inconsistent policy environments which may hinder their ability to participate in, and
benefit from, the international economy.
44 Improving the quality of governance in the
least-developed countries and increasing the coherence between their trade,
development and macroeconomic policies is therefore crucial to enhancing their
economic performance.
4.2.2. Far from leading intrinsically to their marginalization, the increased
participation of developing countries in the global economy should be enormously
beneficial. The channels through which trade liberalization, in particular, can bring
about benefits for developing countries can be summarized as follows: "improved
resource allocation in line with social and marginal costs and benefits; access to better
technologies, inputs and intermediate goods; an economy better able to take
advantage of economies of scale and scope; greater domestic competition; availability
of favourable growth externalities, like the transfer of know-how; and a shake-up of
industry that may create a[n] . . . environment especially conducive to growth."
45 Static
gains from increased economic efficiency as a result of resource reallocation are likely
to be very high in developing countries, since many start out with relatively highly
distorted economies. However, these gains are likely to be dwarfed by dynamic gains
over the longer run as economies adjust to factors such as technological innovation
and greater competition. Taken together, the benefits of trade liberalization will
raise the returns to productive investment in developing countries, thus
enhancing their growth prospects over the medium-term.
43 See Patrick Low, Marcelo Olarreaga and Javier Suarez, "Does Globalization Cause a Higher Concentration of
International Trade and Investment Flows?", Working Paper No. ERAD-98-08, World Trade Organization, 1998.
44 There is strong empirical support for the contention that inappropriate domestic policy environments and the poor
quality of governance have retarded trade and growth in sub-Saharan Africa. See Francis Ng and Alexander Yeats,
“Good Governance and Trade Policy: Are they the Keys to Africa’s Global Integration and Growth?”, Policy Research
Working Paper No. 2038, World Bank, 1998.
45 Dornbusch (1992), pp73-74. See Rudiger Dornbusch, "The Case for Trade Liberalization in Developing Countries",
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 6(1), pp69-85, 1992.25
4.3. Key issues for the developing countries in the next round
4.3.1. One of the key objectives for developing countries in the next trade round will
obviously be to secure improved access to industrialized countries' markets for
industrial products. Despite substantial progress by the industrialized countries in
lowering trade barriers, there is still considerable scope for developing countries to
benefit from further improvements in access to their major export markets. Indeed,
Table 4.1 shows that industrialized countries tend to impose much higher trade
barriers on imports from developing countries than on imports from other industrialized
countries. This reflect differences in the product composition of exports between
industrialized and developing countries. For example, labour-intensive manufactures
feature more prominently in the exports of developing countries and these tend to face
higher trade barriers. This table also shows that developing countries themselves also
impose much higher levels of trade protection on imports from other developing
countries than on imports from industrialized countries. The share of developing-
country manufacturing exports going to other developing countries has been
increasing steadily over time. It has been calculated that if current trends continue,
developing-country markets will account for over half of developing-country exports of
manufactures within the next decade.
46 These trends should be taken into account by
developing countries as they approach the next trade round. It is clear that reductions
in developing countries' rates of protection have helped to stimulate mutual trade in
manufactures between the developing countries themselves.
47 Thus, an increasingly
important component of developing countries' market access strategies should be to
seek further improved access to other developing countries' markets.
Table 4.1. Estimates of MFN applied rates of protection in manufacturing
trade by source and destination
Importing region
Exporting region Industrialized countries Developing countries World
Industrialized countries 0.8 10.9 3.8
Developing countries 3.4 12.8 7.1
World 1.5 11.5 4.7
Source: Hertel and Martin (1999).
4.3.2. A related industrial market-access objective for developing countries in the
next round will be to reduce the degree of tariff escalation facing their exports to
major markets. Tariff escalation is a feature of most countries’ tariff systems. It occurs
when higher tariffs are levied on goods at more advanced levels of processing. Thus,
raw materials and intermediate products generally have relatively low levels of tariff
protection, whilst finished goods produced from those materials generally have
relatively high tariffs. This results in high effective protection of the later stages of
production. In such circumstances, the nominal tariff can be a misleading indicator of
the degree of protection. Tariff escalation is highest in the developing countries,
reflecting the legacy of previous import-substitution policies which were designed to
foster the manufacture or further processing of natural-resource based products
previously exported in primary form. However, most industrialized countries’ tariff
structures are far from uniform. In practice, industrialized countries’ tariff systems can
work against developing countries’ efforts to move into the later stages of production
46 See Thomas Hertel and Will Martin, "Developing Country Interests in Liberalizing Manufactures Trade", paper
presented at a Centre for Economic Policy Research Workshop on New Issues in the World Trading System, London,
19-20 February, 1999.
47 See T.N. Srinivasan, John Whalley and Ian Wooton, "Measuring the Effects of Regionalism on Trade and Welfare",
in Kym Anderson and Richard Blackhurst (eds.), Regional Integration and the Global Trading System, London:
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993.26
and replace some of their exports of rudimentary goods with those of more finished
goods.
48
4.3.3. Services negotiations will be a major component of the Millennium Round. The
services negotiations are likely to focus on widening and deepening the specific
commitments on market access and national treatment made in the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). Traditionally, developing countries have
been somewhat reluctant to include services in the multilateral trade framework.
49
Today, however, there is increasing recognition that developing countries could
stand to make considerable gains from the further liberalization of trade in
services. Services are becoming increasingly important in the economies of the
developing countries. In particular, they are assuming a larger role as inputs to
industrial production. By liberalizing their own services sectors, developing countries
can therefore improve the competitiveness of their industrial sectors. In the Uruguay
Round, the developing countries made far fewer commitments for services
liberalization than did the industrialized countries. The GATS agreement covers only
16 per cent of sectors in the developing countries, compared to 47 per cent in the
industrialized countries. Furthermore, only 7 per cent of services sectors in developing
countries will experience full international competition compared to 25 per cent in
industrialized countries.
50 There is therefore significant potential for developing
countries to benefit from a further opening-up of their services sectors.
4.3.4. Agriculture will also be of significant importance to developing countries in
the Millennium Round. In general, industrialized countries' agricultural policy
distortions exceed those of developing countries in the three key areas of market
access, export subsidies and domestic producer subsidies. It is generally thought that
the welfare gains from reducing industrialized countries' distortions in each of these
areas could be substantial. One study has suggested that fully one-third of the global
welfare gain from eliminating industrialized countries' distortions across all goods
sectors could come from removing distortions in agriculture.
51 This study also
indicates that the welfare gains to developing countries from removing industrialized
countries' distortions in agriculture and processed food are more than twice as large
as those which arise from eliminating industrialized countries' distortions in textiles
and clothing, and that the cost of these distortions to developing countries are almost
as large as the cost of developing countries' own distortions across all goods sectors.
Whilst agricultural exporters have the potential to gain from a reform of world
agricultural trade, concern has been expressed that food-importing countries may
suffer a deterioration in their terms-of-trade should industrialized countries reduce
trade-distorting measures in agriculture. Similar concerns were raised during the
Uruguay Round, especially in relation to many African and some Middle Eastern
48 Laird (1999) notes that "an analysis of tariff escalation by industrial countries in the post-Uruguay Round era shows
a substantial loading against imports from developing countries, making it more difficult for them to develop
downstream processing. Thus, how to reduce or eliminate . . . tariff escalation is one of the key questions to be
addressed in a new round" (p2). See Sam Laird, "Patterns of Protection and Approaches to Liberalization", paper
presented at a Centre for Economic Policy Research Workshop on New Issues in the World Trading System, London,
19-20 February, 1999.
49 Bhagwati (1985) highlights three concerns of developing countries in this respect: that the benefits of multilateral
trade rules in services would accrue mainly to the industrialized countries owing to their comparative advantage in
services; that the new focus on services would distract the attention of trade negotiators away from trade in goods,
especially those where the developing countries enjoy a comparative advantage; and that services include politically
sensitive infrastructure activities. See Jagdish Bhagwati, "Trade in Services and Developing Countries", 10
th Annual
Geneva Lecture delivered at the London School of Economics, 1995.
50 See Bernard Hoekman, "Assessing the General Agreement on Trade in Services", in Will Martin and L. Alan Winters
(eds.), The Uruguay Round and the Developing Economies, World Bank Discussion Papers No. 307, 1995.
51 Anderson, Hoekman and Strutt (1999). See Kym Anderson, Bernard Hoekman and Anna Strutt, "Agriculture and the
WTO: Next Steps", paper presented at a Centre for Economic Policy Research Workshop on New Issues in the World
Trading System, London, 19-20 February, 1999.27
countries.
52 In fact, supply developments since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round
have not borne out these fears. Furthermore, it is increasingly recognized that even
net food-importing countries may gain from a liberalization of world agricultural
trade. This could happen if, following the increase in the price of food, the country
switches from being a net importer to being a net exporter of food.
53 It should also be
remembered that many net food-importing developing countries have highly distorted
agricultural sectors. Recent analysis indicates that when a distortion effect operates
alongside the standard terms-of-trade effect, the former can often reverse the impact
of the latter.
54 Reducing distortions can also help to stimulate domestic production and
even turn some net food-importing countries into net food exporters. Whilst this last
beneficial effect cannot be directly attributable to trade liberalization, it illustrates the
point that countries need to use the opportunity of global trade reform to tackle
domestic policy inadequacies if they are to maximize the potential for gains.
4.3.5. This last point has a more general validity for the discussion of how developing
countries can gain from the Millennium Round. Developing countries' own policies,
including their trade policies, are usually the most significant barriers to the
expansion of their exports, and may therefore curtail growth prospects and
contribute to marginalization. In many developing countries, the legacy of previous
import-substitution policies has created an anti-export bias that still persists. In recent
years, the progress made by developing countries in reversing this situation has been
substantial. An increasing number of countries which have reduced import protection
have managed to benefit from higher levels of export growth. This is not a painless
exercise, as there can be adjustment costs arising from resource reallocation across
sectors. However, the weight of the evidence suggests that the adjustment costs
arising from trade liberalization are typically small for developing countries relative to
the overall benefits.
55 Trade liberalization may also have a positive effect on wages
and employment, and ceteris paribus, on poverty as well, as developing countries shift
away from inefficient capital-intensive production towards more efficient labour-
intensive production. The increased tendency to adopt outward-oriented trade
strategies in the developing countries is to be welcomed. However, liberal trade
regimes are not sufficient in themselves to ensure higher, sustained growth rates
over the medium term. Other ingredients are necessary. These other ingredients
include sound macroeconomic policies (including appropriate exchange rates),
investment in human capital, improvements in domestic infrastructure and the
promotion of good governance and the rule of law. It should also be recognized that
trade liberalization is not a panacea for the challenges facing developing countries. In
particular, complementary policies are needed in many developing countries to ensure
that a larger share of the welfare gains which they can expect from trade reform are
allocated to tackling poverty.
4.3.6. Developing countries also need to alter the way in which they approach
multilateral negotiations, shifting away from their previous defensive stance towards
engaging positively in the mutual exchange of concessions with other WTO members.
One issue where developing countries have often adopted a defensive stance in the
52 See Ian Goldin and Dominique van der Mensbrugghe, “The Uruguay Round: An Assessment of Economy-wide and
Agricultural Reforms” in Will Martin and L. Alan Winters (eds.), The Uruguay Round and the Developing Economies,
World Bank Discussion Papers No. 307, 1995.
53 These and other possibilities for net food-importing countries to gain from agricultural trade liberalization are
discussed in Anderson (1992). See Kym Anderson, "Analytical Issues in the Uruguay Round Negotiations on
Agriculture", European Economic Review, 36, pp519-526, 1992.
54 See Anderson (1997) and Ingco (1997). James E. Anderson, “The Uruguay Round and Welfare in Some Distorted
Agricultural Economies”, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 5923, February, 1997; and
Merlinda D. Ingco, "Has Agricultural Trade Liberalization Improved Welfare in the Least-Developed Countries? Yes",
Policy Research Working Paper No. 1748, World Bank, 1997.
55 Evidence in this respect is reviewed in Matusz and Tarr (1999). See Steven J. Matusz and David G. Tarr, "Adjusting
to Trade Policy Reform", Policy Research Working Paper No. 2142, World Bank, 1999.28
past is over tariff preferences, such as those granted by all industrialized countries to
imports from developing countries under the Generalized System of Preferences
(GSP), or those granted by the EU to imports from the African, Caribbean and Pacific
(ACP) group of countries. The value of these tariff preferences will be eroded by
further multilateral trade liberalization, since importing countries will reduce their MFN
tariffs. The erosion of tariff preferences is likely to be strongly resisted by some
developing countries. However, the evidence suggests that the negative impact on
developing countries of preference erosion is likely to be small.
56 The small
negative impact needs to be balanced against the large potential gains to developing
countries from global trade reform. Furthermore, developing countries will also gain
from an erosion in the preferences granted between industrialized countries through
free-trade areas and customs unions. A related area where developing countries have
maintained a defensive stance is in the practice of so-called "special and differential"
treatment. In practice, this has meant that developing countries enjoy more freedom to
undertake policies which limit access to their markets or provide support to domestic
producers or exporters in ways which are not allowed to other WTO member
countries. Whilst this makes accepting the obligations of WTO membership less
burdensome for developing countries, it should also be remembered that many of the
benefits from the multilateral system only come about because countries have
committed themselves to obligations which are difficult to renege upon (the
advantages of "tying one's hands"). The rules-based system of the WTO, under which
countries must accept binding commitments, offers developing countries the potential
to increase the credibility of their trade reforms. The private sector, and international
investors in particular, will then be more likely to react favourably to such reforms. This
suggests that "special and differential treatment" should focus more on appropriate
transition periods rather than allowing countries to permanently escape binding WTO
commitments.
56 See Raed Safadi and Sam Laird, "The Uruguay Round Agreements: Impact on Developing Countries", World
Development, 24(7), pp1223-1242, 1996.29
5. Modelling multilateral trade liberalization
5.1. The GTAP modelling framework
57
5.1.1. As the global economy becomes increasingly integrated, there is a greater
need to develop tools to study the impact of major policy proposals – such as
multilateral trade liberalization through a new WTO round – which are likely to give
rise to significant interactions between sectors as well as between countries and
regions. Partial equilibrium models, which focus on a single sector in isolation, may be
useful for some purposes but they suffer from a key limitation in that they cannot
consider inter-linkages between sectors. As a result of this limitation, attention has
focused more on general equilibrium models. In the latter, the prices of all goods and
factors of production adjust simultaneously until all markets are in (general)
equilibrium. The improvement in the quality of economic statistics and the rapid
progress which has been made in recent years in the theory and practice of
computable general equilibrium (CGE) modelling makes the use of such models an
attractive prospect. CGE models were widely used to assess the potential impact of
the Uruguay Round negotiations, and it is therefore natural to extend their usage to
explore some of the policy issues which will arise in the next WTO round.
5.1.2. Like any economic model, a CGE model is an abstraction from reality that is
both complex enough to capture the essential features of an economic situation, yet
simple enough to be tractable. A CGE model is a computer representation of a
national economy, or a group of national economies, in which the behaviour of
economic agents is modelled according to standard assumptions from economic
theory (e.g. that firms aim to maximize profits, that households aim to maximize
utility). A central feature of CGE models is their input-output structure. Industries are
explicitly linked through a value-added chain from primary goods, over continuously
higher stages of intermediate processing, to the final assembling of goods and
services for consumption. The link between sectors may be direct, like the input of
steel in the production of motor vehicles, or indirect, via intermediate usage in other
sectors. Sectors are also linked through a number of economy-wide constraints, such
as the availability of factors of production. A common assumption in CGE modelling is
that all productive resources are fully employed. In this case, all sectors cannot
expand simultaneously unless there is technological progress or factor accumulation.
The basic way of working with CGE models is through a "comparative static"
approach. There involves two stages. Firstly, the model is calibrated so that it
reproduces observed patterns of consumption, production and trade in the real
economy. This involves constructing simple functional forms to describe the behaviour
of representative economic agents and then working backwards from the data so that
the transactions of these agents replicate those observed for the real world. This is
known as the model’s base-case equilibrium. Secondly, the policy experiment is
implemented by altering key variables (commonly called a policy shock) and a new
equilibrium is calculated. One can then compare the situation before and after the
policy change and study the implications for welfare and resource allocation in
general.
5.1.3. In order to study the implications of world-wide policy changes on different
countries and regions, one needs to rely on a global CGE model. Global CGE models
have an underlying structure that is multi-regional as well as multi-sectoral. The Global
Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model is perhaps the most widely used modelling
framework for studying the implications of trade policy shocks.
58 The simulations for
57 This section draws on Richard E. Baldwin and Joseph F. Francois, A Computable General Equilibrium Assessment
of EU-US Liberalization Measures, mimeo, European Commission, 1998.
58 See the volume Hertel, Thomas, W., (ed.), Global Trade Analysis: Modelling and Applications, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996.30
the present analysis were run by an independent expert, Professor Joseph Francois of
Erasmus University, Rotterdam, who was also responsible for constructing the version
of the GTAP model used here. Since different variations of the GTAP model exist at
the present time, the remainder of this section is devoted to describing the key
features, underlying assumptions and structure of the model used here. The present
model has a nine-region, nineteen-sector structure. The classification of the nine
regions and nineteen sectors is shown in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. Input-output data for this
structure were derived from the GTAP Version 4 database. This combines detailed
bilateral trade, transport and protection data characterizing economic linkages among
forty-five global regions together with individual country input-output tables which
account for linkages among fifty agricultural, industrial and services sectors. The
input-output tables include, in turn, information on all intra-industry transactions,
payments to factors of production and final demands for goods. Detailed estimates of
post-Uruguay Round trade protection rates for each of these regions and sectors are
now available and were incorporated into the analysis.
Table 5.1. Model regions
Region Corresponds to (in GTAP version 4 database)
EU United Kingdom, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Rest of
European Union
USA United States of America
Japan Japan
Brazil Brazil
India India
ASEAN Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam
Africa Morocco, Rest of North Africa, South African Customs Union, Rest of
Southern Africa, Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa
Other Latin America
and Caribbean
Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean, Venezuela, Colombia, Rest
of the Andean Pact, Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Rest of South America
Rest of the World Australia, New Zealand, Korea, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Sri Lanka,
Rest of South Asia, Canada, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Central
European Associates, Former Soviet Union, Turkey, Rest of Middle East,
Rest of World
5.1.4. Each region has a single representative, composite household which allocates
expenditures over personal consumption and savings (future consumption). The
composite household owns endowments of the factors of production (capital, skilled
labour, unskilled labour and land) and receives income by selling these to firms. It also
receives income from the receipt of tariff revenue and, where applicable, rents from
the sale of import/export quota licences. Part of this income is distributed as subsidy
payments to some sectors, primarily agriculture. In all sectors, firms employ domestic
factors of production as well as intermediate inputs from domestic and foreign sources
to produce outputs in the most cost-efficient way that technology allows. The so-called
Armington assumption involves treating goods in the same sector but produced by
firms in different regions as imperfect substitutes for each other in consumer demand
– in other words, there is product differentiation by country of origin.
59 Thus, wheat
produced in the European Union is a close but imperfect substitute for wheat
produced in the United States. An advantage of the Armington specification is that it
allows for differing degrees of substitution among domestic and imported goods and
also permits changes in the relative prices of different imported goods. Until relatively
recently, most of the CGE-based assessments of multilateral trade liberalization
scenarios have been derived from models which have assumed constant returns to
59 See Paul A. Armington, "A Theory of Demand for Products Differentiated by Place of Production", IMF Staff Papers,
16, pp159-178, 1969.31
scale and perfect competition in all sectors. This is obviously somewhat limiting. The
model used for the present analysis has a somewhat more sophisticated theoretical
structure in that it allows for a mixture of constant returns/perfect competition sectors
and sectors which are characterized by increasing returns to scale and imperfect
competition (the latter are shown in italics in Table 5.2). In imperfectly-competitive
sectors, product differentiation between firms within the same region becomes
possible. Imperfect competition also allows for gains from trade through the greater
exploitation of economies of scale and through pro-competitive effects. Imperfectly
competitive sectors are assumed to display scale economies which are internal to
each firm, depending on its own production level. Furthermore, increased
specialization at intermediate stages of production yields returns due to specialization,
where the sector as a whole becomes more productive the broader the range of
specialized inputs. These gains spill-over through two-way trade in specialized
intermediate goods. With these spill-overs, trade liberalization can lead to global scale
effects related to specialization.
Table 5.2. Model sectors
Sector Corresponds to (in GTAP version 4 database)
Paddy rice Paddy rice
Cereals Wheat, cereal grains
Vegetables, fruit, nuts Vegetables, fruit, nuts
Oil seeds Oil seeds
Sugar (raw) Sugar cane, sugar beet
Plant-based fibres Plant-based fibres
Other agriculture and forestry Crops n.e.c., Bovine cattle, sheep and goats, horses, Animal
products n.e.c., Raw milk, Wool, silk-worm cocoons, Forestry
Fishing Fishing
Energy and other minerals Coal, Oil, Gas, Minerals n.e.c.
Processed agricultural products Bovine cattle, sheep, goat, horse meat products, Meat products
n.e.c., Vegetable oils and fats, Dairy products, Processed rice,
Sugar, Food products n.e.c., Beverages and tobacco products
Textiles and clothing Textiles, Wearing apparel
Motor vehicles and parts Motor vehicles and parts
Wood products Wood products
Metals and metal products Ferrous metals, Metals n.e.c., Metal products
Machinery and equipment Transport equipment n.e.c., Electronic equipment, Machinery
and equipment n.e.c.
Other manufactures Leather products, Paper products, publishing, Petroleum, coal
products, Chemical, rubber, plastic products, Mineral products
n.e.c., Manufactures n.e.c.
Trade and transport services Trade, transport
Business services Financial, business, recreational services
Other activities Electricity, Gas manufacture, distribution, Water, Construction,
Public administration, defence, education, health, Dwellings
N.B. Sectors in italics are modelled according to the assumptions of imperfect competition and increasing
returns to scale. All other sectors are modelled on the basis of perfect competition and constant returns to
scale, but with international product differentiation based on the standard Armington assumption.
5.1.5. In the first instance, sectors with positive scale elasticities are assumed to be
characterized by Chamberlinian large-group monopolistic competition. Each firm is
then a “tiny monopolist”, producing a good over which it has a limited degree of
market power since it is a close, but imperfect, substitute for the output of many other
firms in the same sector. As with perfect competition, the possibility of entry and exit of
firms is allowed. This means that excess profits are driven to zero in the long-run. To
allow for a more sophisticated treatment of imperfect competition, the Chamberlinian32
assumption is replaced by the assumption of Cournot behaviour between oligopolistic
firms, i.e. the assumption of large-group behaviour is replaced with one of small-group
behaviour. The Cournot assumption is one of the standard means of treating
oligopolistic rivalry, in which firms take their rivals’ supply of output to be fixed when
determining their own output. Since market equilibrium with the Cournot assumption
can be interpreted as an equilibrium which has been reached as a result of collusion
between the firms in that market, this has obvious advantages over the Chamberlinian
approach in terms of its ability to capture anti-competitive practices. Once allowance is
made for the possibility of collusion between a relatively small number of large firms
rather than competition between a large number of small firms, it becomes possible to
study the potential impact on firm behaviour of the introduction of a global competition
policy framework. This is done by constructing indices of market power on the basis of
price-cost margins, and making the assumption that a WTO competition policy
agreement leads to a modest reduction in these market power indices. Because of the
assumption of Cournot behaviour, the results from this policy experiment will not be
strictly comparable with those from other experiments where monopolistic competition
is assumed.
5.1.6. The model allows for steady-state trade-investment linkages through a capital
market closure rule which involves fixed net capital inflows and outflows. There is
therefore a limited dynamic link between trade and investment. The static or direct
income effects of trade liberalization can induce shifts in the regional pattern of
savings and investment.
60 These effects relate to classical models of capital
accumulation and growth. Depending on factors such as the marginal product of
capital and underlying savings behaviour, these "accumulation effects" can compound
initial output and welfare gains over the medium-run, and can magnify income gains
and losses. However, the sort of important endogenous growth mechanisms
discussed in section 2 are not captured here, since new trade-growth linkages have
not yet been widely incorporated into applied economic models. The limited manner in
which global trade models treat investment flows means that it is not possible to use
the present model to study the potential impact of a WTO agreement on investment.
Instead, the quantitative analysis presented in section 6 relies on a somewhat crude
estimate of the gains from such an agreement which has been derived from an
independent source. Other limitations of the model also deserved to be mentioned.
One is that rent-seeking behaviour is not captured. Thus, the model may
underestimate the gains from trade liberalization by failing to take into account the
potential impact of reduced rent seeking. In addition, one of the principal limitations of
the present model is that, like almost all CGE models used for assessing multilateral
trade liberalization, it starts with the basic assumption of full employment of all
productive factors at all times. This assumption has to be modified to take into account
adjustment costs.
5.2. The protection data
5.2.1. In order to run a global CGE model it is necessary to employ a database which
is exhaustive in its coverage of regions and sectors. The GTAP Version 4 database
takes 1995 as its base year, and compatible post-Uruguay Round tariff vectors are
now available for this.
61 The main source of information on import tariffs for industrial
products in the GTAP Version 4 database is the WTO Integrated Database (IDB),
which contains the basic records of the outcome of the Uruguay Round negotiations. It
60 This is described in more detail in Joseph F. Francois, Bradley J. McDonald and Håkan Nordström, ”Capital
Accumulation in Applied Trade Models”, in Joseph F. Francois and Kenneth A. Reinert (eds.), Applied Methods for
Trade Policy Analysis: A Handbook, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
61 See Joseph Francois and Anna Strutt, “Post-Uruguay Round Tariff Vectors for GTAP Version 4”, mimeo, January,
1999.33
contains information on the ad valorem equivalents of specific tariffs. The IDB data is
used to calculate averages of MFN applied tariffs obtained at the tariff line level and
aggregated up to the GTAP concordance using trade-weights. Because of the fact
that there can be considerable variations in tariff rates at the tariff line level within a
GTAP sector, trade-weighting can sometimes give rise to very large differences in
bilateral tariffs. Imports from two countries which would normally be subject to the
same MFN tariffs at the tariff-line level need not, therefore, be subject to the same
bilateral tariff at the GTAP sectoral level. In addition, some regional tariff preferences
are included in the bilateral tariff data (corresponding to the major regional trading
arrangements). The GTAP protection data also include a limited amount of information
on industrial non-tariff barriers, the tariff-equivalents of which are derived by
calculating the wedge between domestic and world prices.
5.2.2. In relation to agricultural products, the information on protection and support in
the GTAP Version 4 database is based on the latest available OECD estimates of
Producer Subsidy Equivalents (PSEs). The PSE provides a concise measure of the
transfers to producers resulting from government policies, capturing both market price
support and subsidies. The market price support component of the PSE is calculated
using the wedge between domestic and world prices, and captures the effects of
import tariffs and equivalent measures as well as export subsidies. Some developing
countries also make use of import subsidies for key agricultural products which form
part of the staple diet of their populations. An import subsidy in effect constitutes
negative protection and will give rise to a negative figure for the market price support
component of the PSE measure. The production subsidy component of the PSE
captures direct and indirect transfers to producers as a result of government policies.
This includes such transfers as the EU’s area and headage payments. It should be
noted that the PSE measure is not the same as the Aggregate Measure of Support
(AMS) which was used in the Uruguay Round negotiations on agriculture. The AMS is
not an economically meaningful estimate of producer support because certain types of
subsidy involving direct payments to farmers were deliberately excluded from its
calculation. It should also be pointed out that the OECD has recently changed the
PSE classification, principally in order to take better account of different types of direct
payments.
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5.2.3. In relation to services trade, the task of deriving estimates of protection rates
(in terms of tariff-equivalents) is made extremely difficult by the different nature of the
trade barriers which apply to this form of trade as opposed to trade in goods.
63
Barriers to international trade in services do not take the form of import tariffs, but
rather of a complex variety of prohibitions, quantitative restrictions and government
regulations. An example of the latter are the regulations on the movement of persons.
Some types of services rely on physical movement of workers. However, it is very
difficult to have a clear idea of the tariff-equivalents of such measures. Until now,
empirical researchers have tended to use "guesstimates" of the degree of protection
afforded by countries to their services sectors which are derived from the
commitments made in countries' GATS schedules.
64 Despite the usefulness of these
guesstimates, there is a widespread view that they may have overestimated the
degree of protection in services markets.
65 For the present study, a different approach
62 It has, at the same time, changed the name of this measure to Producer Support Estimate. The main components of
the old and new PSE measures are, however, basically the same.
63 This issue is discussed in Bernard Hoekman and Carlos A. Primo Braga, "Protection and Trade in Services", Policy
Research Working Paper No. 1747, World Bank, 1997.
64 The guesstimates are derived in Bernard Hoekman, “Assessing the General Agreement on Trade in Services”, in
Will Martin and L. Alan Winters (eds.), The Uruguay Round and the Developing Economies, World Bank Discussion
Papers No. 307, 1995.
65 Many researchers have chosen to scale down the guesstimates. See, for example, Australian Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade, Global Trade Reform: Maintaining Momentum, 1999.34
was used to derive estimates of the degree of protection applying to services. This
was based on results generated by a gravity model of services trade. The resulting
estimates of protection rates are somewhat more modest than the more commonly
used guesstimates. However, as in any exercise of this sort, it is difficult to determine
the accuracy of the figures used. Given the importance of services sectors in both
industrialized and developing countries, this provides an important caveat for the
results generated by the model.35
6. Quantifying the benefits
6.1. The policy experiments
6.1.1. Two different policy experiments were conducted in order to quantify the
potential impact of key areas of multilateral liberalization which might feature in the
sort of comprehensive trade round which the EU is proposing. Experiment 1 focuses
on the core issues of market access and trade facilitation.I nr e l a t i o nt om a r k e t
access, the effects of "across-the-board" reductions in protection in all agricultural,
industrial and services sectors are modelled. An attempt is made to quantify the
impact of both a 20 per cent and a 50 per cent cut in applied protection by all regions
in each of these three areas.
66 Both the 20 per cent and 50 per cent global
liberalization scenarios are each combined with estimates of the potential impact of a
multilateral agreement on trade facilitation. This is done by assuming that such an
agreement leads to a modest reduction of 1 per cent in international trade costs.
6.1.2. Experiment 2 considers the potential benefit to be derived from a WTO
agreement on trade and competition policy. For this experiment, a change in the
model's underlying assumptions regarding the nature of imperfect competition is
required. It is assumed that sectors are either perfectly competitive or oligopolistic
(rather than, as previously, perfectly competitive or monopolistically competitive).
67 It
is further assumed that a WTO agreement leads to a modest reduction in the degree
of collusion between firms operating in oligopolistic markets. This is done by deriving
indices of market power which are constructed from estimates of mark-ups of price
over marginal costs. The index ranges from i=0 ,...,1 , where 0 is perfect
competition and 1 is full collusion (equivalent to monopoly). The policy experiment
involves reducing this index by 10 per cent, i.e. a figure of 0.5 would become 0.45
after the policy experiment.
68
6.1.3. There are a number of important areas of potential liberalization which may
feature in a comprehensive Millennium Round which are not covered by the policy
experiments in the present study. An attempt is nevertheless made to quantify the
potential impact of an WTO agreement on investment, although this cannot be done
within the framework of the model. There is also a brief discussion of the possible
environmental implications of the Millennium Round. The inclusion of other topics in
the agenda for the Millennium Round (e.g. agreements on intellectual property and
government procurement) could add significantly to the round's overall impact on
global welfare. In this respect, the results presented below may underestimate the full
welfare gains which the round could generate.
6.1.4. Before proceeding, it is perhaps useful to highlight the fact that there are a
number of important caveats which should be borne in mind when interpreting
the results generated by the model. The first such caveat applies to the protection
data. The model has been run with the most recent estimates of post-Uruguay Round
protection rates for agricultural and industrial sectors. However, the accuracy of these
estimates is likely to vary somewhat across countries and sectors. In relation to
services trade, an attempt has been made to improve on the standard "guesstimates"
of the tariff equivalents of protection which are commonly used in empirical work. The
figures used in the present study appear to be more reasonable than these
guesstimates. However, as in any exercise of this sort, it is difficult to determine the
66 The underlying assumption is that all countries participate in the liberalization of trade barriers. This is equivalent to
assuming that countries such as China and the Russian Federation have joined the WTO.
67 The behaviour of firms in oligopolistic markets is modelled according to the Cournot assumption, whereby firms
compete on the basis of quantities.
68 Note that because of the differences in the model's underlying assumptions about the nature of imperfect
competition, the results generated for the competition policy experiment are not strictly comparable with the results
from the market access/trade facilitation experiment.36
accuracy of the figures used. A second caveat applies to the model’s underlying
assumptions and, in particular, to the categorization of different sectors as exhibiting
either perfect competition and constant returns to scale or imperfect competition and
increasing returns to scale. Clearly, the definition of sectors in this model involves
applying rather aggregate labels to describe often very varied industries. It is
inevitable that a certain amount of detail will be lost in this process. Many industries
which are described according to one categorization may contain many branches
where the other categorization is more appropriate. Furthermore, it may not be
appropriate to apply the same categorization of a particular sector across all countries.
A final caveat concerns the estimates of the various elasticities which are contained in
the model. These parameters correspond more or less to a certain consensus which
exists among applied researchers, given the estimates which have been derived from
empirical work. However, it is worth emphasizing that they are still only estimates. The
above concerns may tend to cancel out at a more aggregate level. This implies that
one may have somewhat more confidence in the model's overall results than on its
more detailed estimates.
6.2. Experiment 1: market access negotiations and trade facilitation
6.2.1. The results from experiment 1 indicate that the welfare gains from further
improvements in market access and from a modest reduction in trading costs due to
an agreement on trade facilitation could be substantial. It is estimated that the global
welfare gain from the market access plus trade facilitation package could be
close to $400 billion. In order to put this figure in context, it should be pointed out
that it is the equivalent of adding an economy the size of the Netherlands or the
Republic of Korea to the world economy each year. Another way to appreciate the
magnitude of the gains from further multilateral trade liberalization is to note that the
figure of $400 billion is around twice the OECD estimate of the benefits of full
implementation of the Uruguay Round.
69 The model also predicts that all regions
stand to benefit from further multilateral liberalization, although the distribution
of welfare gains is likely to be somewhat uneven. To a large extent, this reflects
the large differences between countries in their existing levels and patterns of trade
protection. An important point to bear in mind is that the greatest gains from
multilateral trade liberalization are usually derived when countries dismantle their own
trade protection.
6.2.2. The negotiations on market access for agricultural, industrial and services
products will be at the core of the Millennium Round negotiations. Agriculture and
services will certainly feature in the talks, as these issues were included in the "built-in
agenda" of ongoing liberalization established at the end of the Uruguay Round.
Industrial products have featured in every previous multilateral trade round, and seem
very likely to be included in the agenda for the Millennium Round. In addition to these
core market access negotiations, there is also considerable support for including trade
facilitation on the agenda of a new round. Table 6.1 presents the results generated by
the CGE model for the impact on welfare of a 20 per cent and a 50 per cent "across-
the-board" reduction in applied rates of protection by all countries in agriculture,
industrial products and services coupled with an agreement on trade facilitation which
results in a 1 per cent reduction in the transactions costs of international trade. The
results are presented in terms of 1995 US dollars.
70 As can be seen from this table,
the model suggests that the global annual welfare gain could range from $219 billion,
in the case of the 20 per cent scenario, to $385, in the case of the 50 per cent
69 The OECD estimates that liberalization under the Uruguay Round has generated an a global welfare gain of around
$200 billion per annum. See OECD, Open Markets Matter: the Benefits of Trade and Investment Liberalization, 1998.
70 Figures derived from the GTAP Version 4 database are all in 1995 US dollars. Presenting the figures in these terms
also facilitates comparisons with other similar studies.37
scenario. This would be the equivalent of an annual increase in global welfare of
between 0.8 per cent and 1.4 per cent.
Table 6.1. Experiment 1: Market access and trade facilitation
Estimates of medium-run annual welfare gains
20 per cent global cut in
applied protection in
agriculture, industrial
products and services,
plus trade facilitation
agreement
50 per cent global cut in
applied protection in
agriculture, industrial
products and services,
plus trade facilitation
agreement
1995 US $
Billions
Welfare
%age
1995 US $
Billions
Welfare
%age
EU 46 0.7% 92 1.4%
USA 28 0.5% 45 0.7%
Japan 25 0.7% 47 1.3%
Brazil 11 2.0% 28 4.9%
India 5 2.1% 11 4.4%
ASEAN 27 6.6% 43 10.4%
Africa 3 0.9% 6 1.6%
Other Latin America and Caribbean 22 2.8% 50 6.3%
Rest of the World 51 1.4% 63 1.7%
TOTAL 219 0.8% 385 1.4%
Source: Commission services.
Note – the results in this table are derived on the basis of an underlying assumption that sectors are
either perfectly competitive and exhibit constant returns to scale, or are monopolistically competitive with
increasing returns to scale.
6.2.3. The estimates in Table 6.1 indicate that the potential welfare gain for the
European Union from the market access plus trade facilitation package could amount
to an annual windfall of between $46 billion and $92 billion. This is equivalent to an
annual welfare gain of between 0.7 and 1.4 per cent. In percentage terms, the welfare
gains to the EU are similar to those enjoyed by Japan but larger than those which
accrue to the United States. A number of factors explain the large gains for the EU.
Firstly, agriculture is currently rather highly protected in the EU and liberalization in
this area could provide important benefits for EU consumers. Secondly, EU producers
of industrial products would stand to make gains from improved access to foreign
markets, especially in developing countries, where they currently face relatively high
trade barriers. One important difference between the EU and the United States is that,
because of NAFTA, the latter already conducts a much larger share of its trade on a
relatively free basis. This means that, in relative terms, the impact of further
multilateral liberalization on the degree of access to foreign markets is likely to be
more important for the EU than for the United States. Thirdly, given that the EU is the
world’s largest exporter of commercial services, and given also the high share of
services in EU GDP, it is hardly surprising that the simulations suggest that the EU
stands to make large gains in services sectors. However, it is important to stress the
fact that the prediction of potentially large welfare gains for the EU derives mainly from
its current pattern of protection. Agriculture currently benefits from a relatively high
degree of protection in the EU compared to other sectors. An important general
equilibrium effect of EU liberalization will therefore arise from the incentive for
resources to move out of relatively highly protected sectors and into sectors in which
the EU has a comparative advantage or which benefit from scale economies. With
multilateral liberalization, EU industrial and services sectors would then be in a38
relatively stronger position to expand and take advantage of improved access to
foreign markets. Also of interest is the potential impact of a trade round on
employment in the EU. Unfortunately, this experiment does not lend itself to
estimating employment effects since the underlying model assumes full employment.
A version of the model has been adapted to allow for wage rigidities and, thereby,
unemployment. This generates an employment effect in the EU from trade
liberalization, but this is modest.
6.2.4. For the United States, the results suggest that the annual welfare gain from
the market access plus trade facilitation package could be between $28 billion and
$45 billion. This is equivalent to an annual welfare increase of between 0.5 and 0.7
per cent. The benefits for the US are therefore large, but not as large as in the case of
the EU. To a large extent, the explanation for this difference lies in the current pattern
of US trade protection. This is currently highest in industrial sectors (e.g. textiles and
clothing) which are, for the most part, treated as exhibiting increasing returns to scale
under the assumptions made here. Thus, as the US reduces protection, the scope for
it to benefit from resource reallocation into sectors with scale economies is not as
large as in the case of the EU. In addition, as has already been noted, the US already
conducts a relatively high share of its foreign trade on a close to free basis. Further
improvements in access to foreign markets are therefore worth less to the US than to
the EU. Japan presents the opposite case to the US in terms of its current pattern of
protection. Japanese protection is currently most severe in the agricultural sectors.
Indeed, the Japanese agricultural sectors have the highest level of protection among
the major industrialized economies. Japanese consumers therefore stand to make
large welfare gains as these sectors are opened up to foreign competition. However,
Japan can also benefit from a more neutral pattern of incentives which would
encourage resources to move out of agriculture and into industrial sectors, where it
can benefit from increased specialization and the exploitation of economies of scale.
These factors provide the main explanations for the model’s prediction of large
potential welfare gains to the Japanese economy from a global cut in protection of
between $25 billion and $47 billion on an annual basis (the equivalent to an annual
welfare increase of between 0.7 and 1.3 per cent).
6.2.5. The results in Table 6.1 indicate that over half the global welfare gains from
the market access plus trade facilitation package will accrue to regions outside the
major industrialized countries. In particular, a large share of the global welfare gains
will go to developing countries. Among the various developing regions, the ASEAN
countries could emerge as major beneficiaries from a new trade round. The annual
welfare gain for these countries could be between $27 billion and $43 billion,
depending on the scale of the multilateral increase in market access. This would be
the equivalent of an annual welfare change of between 6.6 and 10.4 per cent. The
potential for very large gains from the market access and trade facilitation package is
explained by these countries' very high trade to GDP ratios compared to other
developing regions, and by their existing patterns of trade protection. The former
implies that the ASEAN countries stand to make large gains from an agreement on
trade facilitation, whilst the latter implies that they have a significant potential to benefit
from a reallocation of resources out of currently highly protected sectors into sectors in
which they have a comparative advantage.
6.2.6. Table 6.1 model also suggests that there could be large gains for Brazil and
other Latin American countries from the market access plus trade facilitation package.
In recent years, many countries in this region have made significant progress in
adopting comprehensive trade reforms as part of wide-ranging structural adjustment
programmes. However, the results from the present analysis indicate that further
market opening on a multilateral basis would yield significant additional benefits for39
the region. In the case of Brazil, there is still relatively high protection in a number of
industrial sectors, with a very high degree of tariff escalation in some cases.
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Additional trade reform offers Brazil the opportunity to benefit from more efficient
allocation of resources across sectors which would follow from a lower and more
uniform structure of protection. The predicted annual welfare gain for Brazil ranges
from $11 billion, in the case of a 20 per cent global reduction in protection, to $28
billion, under a 50 per cent global cut. In percentage terms, this is equivalent to an
increase in welfare of between 2 and 5 per cent. A similar story applies to other Latin
American countries, for whom the annual welfare gains from the market access plus
trade facilitation package could be even larger. The predicted annual welfare gain for
these countries ranges from $22 billion, which is equivalent to a 2.8 per cent increase
in annual welfare, to $50 billion, which is equivalent to a 6.3 per cent increase in
welfare.
6.2.7. Table 6.1 also indicates that India could potentially stand to make large gains
from a global reduction in protection across agricultural, industrial and services
sectors, and a multilateral agreement on trade facilitation. The annual welfare gain for
India from this package is estimated at between $5 billion and $11 billion – which, in
percentage terms, is equivalent to an increase of between 2 and 4.4 per cent in
annual welfare. Like the reforms which the country undertook in the early 1990s,
multilateral trade liberalization offers India the chance to benefit from reversing its
traditional stance of favouring inefficient import-competing sectors and penalizing
exporting activities, particularly in labour-intensive manufactures.
72 As India gains
improved access to foreign markets from a new round, its manufacturing industries
will therefore be in a stronger position to benefit from increased specialization in
sectors in which it has an underlying comparative advantage. Finally, Table 6.1
indicates that Africa, too, would benefit from further multilateral trade liberalization
over the medium run. The predicted gains for Africa range from $3 billion to $6 billion.
In percentage terms, this is equivalent to an annual welfare gain of between 1 and 1.6
per cent. To appreciate the significance of the potential welfare gain for Africa, it is
worth noting that the upper figure is equivalent to adding an economy the size of
Ghana to Africa's GDP on an annual basis. Nevertheless, the gains for Africa from the
market access plus trade facilitation package are more modest than is the case for
most other developing regions. There are two main factors underlying this result.
Firstly, although many African countries have made important strides in opening up
their economies in recent years, protection remains high, especially in some sectors.
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There is therefore scope for Africa to benefit from further reducing its own levels of
protection. However, since its exports to industrialized countries already face relatively
low tariff barriers compared to other developing regions, it does not stand to gain as
much as the latter from further improvements in market access. Secondly, Africa is at
present heavily reliant on food imports. Since the liberalization scenarios considered
here involve substantial cuts in agricultural price distortions among major supplying
nations and consequent reductions in subsidized exports, they necessarily give rise to
71 Tariff escalation in Brazil and other Southern Cone countries is discussed in Sam Laird, “MERCOSUR: Objectives
and Achievements”, Working Paper No. TPRD-97-002, World Trade Organization, 1997.
72 India’s inward-oriented trade and investment regime seems to have been a major contributory factor to its extremely
disappointing productivity performance over much of the post-war period. See, for example, Jagdish Bhagwati, India in
Transition: Freeing the Economy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993. As a result of reforms begun in the early
1990s, India was able to attract larger inflows of foreign investment and also increased its participation in international
trade. As a result, India achieved annual average growth rates of GDP of 7 per cent between 1993 and 1996.
Economic growth has slowed since then, however, and this has prompted calls for India to renew the impetus for trade
and investment liberalization (see WTO Secretariat, Trade Policy Review Mechanism: India, WTO, 1998) as a means
of revitalizing the economy. The present analysis suggests that increased multilateral opening of the Indian economy
as part of a global package of trade reform could be of immense help in this respect.
73 See, for example, Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, “Sources of Slow Growth in African Economies”, Journal of
African Economies, October, 1997. It should be noted that, following economic reforms in many sub-Saharan African
countries, the pattern of protection differs significantly between sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa. Africa is therefore
a very heterogeneous region as far as the present model is concerned.40
an increase in world prices. This will obviously have negative repercussions on food-
importing regions, but the potential positive supply response to higher world prices
from African producers is not fully taken into account. The key question for African
governments is whether they can seize the opportunities which a new trade round will
provide. If multilateral trade liberalization in agriculture were to be accompanied by
key structural reforms in African economies, the welfare gains to Africa could be
significantly higher than those presented in Table 6.1. However, experience from the
Uruguay Round shows that there is nothing automatic about this happening.
6.2.8. A final point should be stressed in relation to the model's predictions of
significant welfare gains from the market access plus trade facilitation package. There
is an important distinction to be made between applied rates of tariff protection and
bound rates (also known as tariff ceilings). Applied rates are those tariffs which are
actually levied. Bound rates, on the other hand, refer to the maximum levels which
countries have committed themselves at the WTO not to exceed. In most cases, the
distinction between bound and applied tariffs is unimportant for the industrialized
countries, since the difference between the two is usually not significant. For
developing countries, on the other hand, the difference between bound and applied
rates is often very large. Not only does this reduce the degree of certainty which can
be attached to developing countries' trade policies, it also means that many
developing countries could conceivably agree to make significant reductions in tariff
bindings without actually changing their applied rates of protection by very much. The
problem is that WTO negotiations usually focus on achieving reductions in bound tariff
rates. When countries agree to reduce their bound rates, it is assumed that applied
rates adjust by the minimum amount necessary to ensure that they do not exceed the
former. If developing countries were to only agree to minimal reductions in bound
rates which did not lead to a significant liberalization of applied rates, this would
obviously reduce the benefits which they might obtain from the Millennium Round.
This is due to the fact that most of the benefits which countries can expect from
multilateral trade liberalization are usually obtained from reductions in their own levels
of trade protection.
6.3. Experiment 2: trade and competition
6.3.1. If the Millennium Round is to be truly comprehensive in scope, it will need to
go beyond traditional market access concerns and address other issues which are of
importance to the global trading system. One such issue is trade and competition. The
EU supports the adoption by the WTO of a binding framework of multilateral rules on
competition. The basic architecture of such a framework could include core principles
and common rules relating to the adoption and enforcement of competition law,
common approaches on anti-competitive practices with a significant impact on
international trade and investment, and international co-operation on competition
policy. In order to model the potential impact of such a multilateral framework, it is
necessary to make change some of the underlying assumptions in the CGE model.
Firstly, sectors which were previously modelled as monopolistically competitive are
now treated as oligopolistic.
74 Secondly, it is assumed that the adoption of a
multilateral framework of rules on trade and competition leads to a very modest
reduction in the degree of collusion between firms in oligopolistic sectors. This second
assumption is implemented by constructing market power indices on the basis of
price-cost mark-ups. The indices range from i=0 ,...,1 ,w h e r e0i sp e r f e c t
competition and 1 is full collusion (equivalent to monopoly). The policy experiment
involves reducing these indices by 10 per cent, i.e. a figure of 0.5 would become 0.45
74 In particular, oligopolistic firms are assumed to adopt Cournot behaviour. In other words, they compete over
quantities.41
after the policy experiment. Table 6.2. presents the results of this experiment in terms
of welfare gains for the regions in the model. Because of the differences in the
underlying assumptions about the nature of imperfect competition, the results in this
table are not strictly comparable with those shown in Table 6.1. for the market access
plus trade facilitation experiments.
Table 6.2. Experiment 2: Trade and competition policy
Estimates of medium-run annual welfare gains
1995 US $ Billions Welfare %age
EU 70 . 1 %
USA 90 . 2 %
Japan 12 0.4%
Brazil 6 1.1%
India 10 . 5 %
ASEAN 5 1.2%
Africa 4 1%
Other Latin America and Caribbean 10 1.2%
Rest of the World 30 0.8%
TOTAL 84 0.3%
Source: Commission services.
Note – the results in this table are derived on the basis of an underlying assumption that sectors are
either perfectly competitive or oligopolistic.
6.3.2. As can be seen from Table 6.2, the global welfare gain from a multilateral
agreement on trade and competition which results in a modest reduction in the degree
of collusion between firms in oligopolistic markets is potentially large. Such an
agreement could add an estimated $84 billion to global welfare on an annual basis. As
in the previous policy experiment, the benefits are distributed somewhat unevenly
between regions. This reflects the fact that regions differ in terms of the relative
importance of oligopolistic sectors in their economies. In addition, the degree of
presumed oligopolistic collusion (calculated on the basis of price-cost mark-ups) also
varies between regions. As one would expect, regions which already benefit from well
established competition policy frameworks gain least. Only one-third of the global
welfare gains accrue to the major industrialized countries. The percentage change in
welfare for the EU and the United States from the agreement is only between 0.1 and
0.2 per cent. For Japan, on the other hand, the potential welfare gains is somewhat
larger, at 0.4 per cent. For the developing regions, the benefits of a WTO agreement
on trade and competition increase still further. For the ASEAN countries, for example,
the potential annual welfare increase is estimated to be 1.4 per cent. This reflects the
relatively high exposure to international trade of ASEAN countries coupled with the
estimated high degree of collusion in oligopolistic sectors (computed from estimates of
price-cost margins). The fact that developing regions are the major potential
beneficiaries of a multilateral agreement on trade and competition should be borne in
mind when considering what are the appropriate transition periods for countries to
adopt such a framework.
6.4. A WTO agreement on investment
6.4.1. Another issue which could feature on the agenda of a truly comprehensive
trade round is investment. The rapid growth of FDI flows in recent years, particularly to
developing countries, has reinforced the need for more comprehensive rules in this
domain. The desire of developing countries to attract increased FDI inflows reflects
the view that such inflows may promote economic development by stimulating42
productivity growth and boosting exports.
75 The growth of FDI flows has been
facilitated by the adoption of bilateral investment treaties (BITs). However, despite the
proliferation of BITs in recent years, this does not guarantee the objective of a stable
and predictable climate for investment on a world-wide basis. There are sound
economic reasons for seeking to establish such a climate through a rules-based
multilateral investment regime. For example, if incumbent firms in potential host
countries are able to block the entry of foreign firms, they may be able to capture
producer rents but these are likely to be offset by the welfare losses to consumers
resulting from reduced competition. This is because the basic problem when firms
have a monopoly position is one of under-production – the price at which monopolists
sell their output exceeds marginal cost. A multilateral agreement that grants foreign
firms access to such protected markets could be beneficial to both host and source
countries. Consumers in the host country would benefit from reducing domestic firms'
monopoly power. This would promote economic efficiency – the benefits to consumers
from the additional units of output that would then be supplied would outweigh the
resource cost of producing them. A binding multilateral framework would also enhance
the credibility of host countries' policy regimes. If potential investors are risk averse,
the adoption of more investment-friendly policies may be insufficient by themselves to
enable countries to benefit from increased inward flows of FDI. This is especially so in
countries with a history of policy reversals. By committing themselves to accept
international rules, on the other hand, countries can make credible guarantees against
further policy reversals, thus anchoring the expectations of investors.
6.4.2. There is already some history of this issue being discussed at the WTO. The
Uruguay Round negotiations led to the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment
Measures (TRIMS). The TRIMS agreement is not intended to regulate investment as
such, but rather to prevent countries from introducing trade-distorting investment
measures, such as local content requirements. The WTO has also established a
Working Group on the Relationship between Trade and Investment. The WTO would
therefore seem to be a logical place to begin negotiations on a multilateral investment
framework. This is especially true given the difficulties encountered by the
industrialized countries in seeking to negotiate a Multilateral Agreement on Investment
(MAI) at the OECD. One obvious advantage of conducting negotiations at the WTO
rather than the OECD is that it would enable both industrialized and developing
countries to shape the agreement. There is nevertheless a reluctance on the part of
some countries to include investment in the new WTO negotiations.
76 Perhaps part of
the explanation for this reluctance can be found in the fact that it is difficult to arrive at
a quantitative estimate of the benefits from a multilateral investment framework.
Because of this, countries may not have a clear idea of what would be at stake in such
negotiations and of what the potential benefits to themselves could be.
6.4.3. Trade and investment linkages in global CGE models are treated in a
somewhat simplistic manner. This applies even to models, such as the present one,
with an endogenous capital stock. Thus, it is not possible to use this version of the
GTAP CGE model to study the potential economic impact of the introduction of a
WTO agreement on investment. Instead, the present analysis relies on an
independent estimate of the possible welfare gains which has been produced in a
somewhat crude manner. This independent estimate puts the annual welfare gain for
the world as a whole from adopting such an agreement at around $75 billion.
77 This
75 See Magnus Blomstrom and Ari Kokko, “How Foreign Investment Affects Host Countries”, Policy Research Working
Paper No. 1745, World Bank, 1997.
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77 See Edward M. Graham, "Trade and Investment at the WTO: Just Do It!", in Jeffrey J. Schott (ed.), Launching New
Global Trade Talks: An Action Agenda, Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, Special Report N° 12,
September, 1998, p37.43
estimate is derived by noting that a conservative estimate of the value-added by
overseas affiliates of multinational firms is in excess of $1.5 trillion annually. This
figure is considered to be a conservative underestimate because it does not take into
account the value-added created by suppliers to these affiliates or by parent
operations. Nevertheless, it can be taken as approximately correct. Thus, if the
adoption of a WTO investment framework results in improved resource allocation to
the extent of a 5 per cent additional benefit, this would give an annual welfare gain of
$75 billion. One would expect the welfare gains to be concentrated more among those
countries where the current investment regime is most in need of improvement. In
other words, many developing countries could be significant beneficiaries.
6.5. The impact on the environment
6.5.1. Because of data limitations it is difficult to capture the environmental impact of
trade liberalization measures through the use of applied economic models.
78 Whilst
data is available for the pollution content of different industries in the case of specific
countries, there is currently no general database of industry-specific pollution data on
a country-by-country basis.
79 If such a database were available, it would be possible
to use a CGE model to simulate changes in production and consumption patterns that
are likely to arise from trade liberalization and then to use these results to calculate
the associated changes in pollution by different industries. Such an exercise can
capture what is referred to as the composition effect of trade liberalization on the
environment (if expanding export sectors are less polluting on average than
contracting import-competing sectors, the impact of trade liberalization on local
environmental quality will be positive). It can also capture the scale effect of trade
liberalization (by stimulating growth, trade liberalization may be associated with
greater use of resources and increased pollution). However, it cannot capture the
crucially important technique effect (the income-induced reduction in pollution per unit
of output). To capture this latter effect one also needs to know how different
governments will respond to income growth in terms of upgrading their environmental
standards. Working within these limitations, empirical researchers have constructed
numerical models which can be used to study the impact of trade liberalization on
environmental quality. These models show that trade liberalization may be detrimental
to the local environment in countries with a comparative advantage in more pollution-
intensive industries, but may improve local environmental quality elsewhere. However,
a key result of these models is that the welfare gains associated with trade
liberalization are likely to be sufficiently large to pay for additional abatement costs in
order to undo any harmful repercussions on the environment and still leave a
significant net surplus. This finding helps to illustrate the more general point that trade
barriers are not a substitute for sound environmental policies. Trade liberalization can
be combined with improved environmental policies and enhanced co-operation at the
international level to enhance sustainable development.
78 This paragraph draws on Håkan Nordström and Scott Vaughan, Trade and Environment, WTO Special Studies, 4,
World Trade Organization, 1999.
79 A tentative analysis of the pollution content of EU manufacturing trade can be found in the chapter on ‘Trade and
Environment’ in European Commission, The European Union as a World Trade Partner, European Economy Reports
and Studies, No. 3, 1997.